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THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 
The thirty-fourth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Asso-
ciation was held Saturday, April 11, 1964, at the South Carolina Archives 
and the University of South Carolina, Columbia. About sixty-eight members 
and guests attended the programs. 
The South Carolina Archives was the site of the registration and coffee 
hour and the morning session. State Archivist Charles Lee welcomed the 
members and invited them to make use of the Archives. The program con-
sisted of a paper by Gordon K. Harrington, University of South Carolina, 
"The Protestant Missionary in China: Problems of the First Treaty Period, 
1842-1860," and one by Frederick F. Ritsch, Converse College, "French 
Communism and the Non-Communist Intellectuals, 1949." 
Luncheon was held in Russell House of the University of South Caro-
lina. It was followed by a brief business session at which the Secretary-
Treasurer submitted his reports which were approved. Other business in-
cluded the announcement that the Association will hold its 1965 annual 
meeting at Charleston and a report from the Executive Committee nominat-
ing this slate of officers for 1964-1965: 
President: Robert S. Lambert, Clemson University 
Vice-President: Lewis P. Jones, Wofford College 
Secretary-Treasurer: Robert C. Tucker, Furman University 
Executive Committee member: Bradley D. Bargar, University of 
South Carolina 
Nominations from the floor were called for, but there was none. The report 
was accepted without dissent. President Sanders announced that the Execu-
tive Committee had re-elected George C. Rogers, Jr., University of South 
Carolina, editor of the Proceedings. Daniel W. Hollis, University of South 
Carolina, announced an essay contest conducted by the South Carolina 
Confederate War Centennial Commission. (A copy of the terms of the 
contest is attached to the file copy.) 
The afternoon session was held in room 205, Russell House, and it pro-
vided two papers: George S. McCowen, Jr., Wofford College, "The Charles 
Town Board of Police, 1780-1782: A Study in Civil Administration under 
Military Occupation," and Ronald D. Burnside, Presbyterian College, 
''Racism in the Administrations of Governor Cole Blease." 
At the banquet session, held in the faculty dining room of Russell House, 
an address was delivered by Dr. Preston D. Slosson, University of Michigan, 
"The Twentieth Century: Age of the Dictators." President Sanders ex-
pressed the appreciation of the Association to Professor Slosson for his inter-
esting paper and to the South Carolina Archives and the University of 
South Carolina for their hospitality, and he then adjourned the meeting at 
8:30 p. m. 
THE PROTESTANT MISSIONARY IN CHINA: PROBLEMS 
OF THE FIRST TREATY PERIOD, 1842-1860 
GORDON K. HARRINGTON 
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the basic problems 
either faced by, or precipitated by, Protestant missionaries during the years 
of their first concerted drive to convert China to Christianity. This era 
roughly parallels that of the First Treaty Period which lasted from approxi-
mately 1842 to 1860. 
Protestantism, originally, came to China at a much earlier time than the 
First Treaty Period, but on an extremely limited basis. The first Protestant 
missionaries accompanied Dutch traders to China in 1627, preaching the 
gospel on Formosa. However, when the Dutch community was expelled 
from that island in 1662 Protestantism disappeared. 1 
The modern Protestant movement began in 1807 when the Rev. Dr. Rob-
ert Morrison of the London Missionary Society began his ministry at 
Canton, the only Chinese port open to Westerners at the time. He remained 
at his lonely post for twenty-two years, before he was joined, in 1829, by 
the American missionary, the Rev. Dr. Elijah Coleman Bridgman.2 But even 
with this help positive results were few and far between. As noted later by 
S. Wells Williams this was a time when there "were no schools, no printing 
presses, and no hospitals. . . . The Bible . . . was translated; but it could 
not be printed in the country, nor easily introduced when it was printed. 
It was not altogether safe for a Chinese to be seen reading a tract which 
spoke of Jesus, much less for him to undertake to distribute them; and it 
was even dangerous for him to engage to print them."3 
The first break in the flood gates resh·icting the flow of Protestantism 
came as a result of the Opium War fought between China and Great Britain 
during the years 1839-1842. Dissatisfied with the existing conditions of 
trade, smarting under alleged insults to their dignity, and angered because 
of the destruction by Chinese officials of opium belonging to Western busi-
nessmen worth six million dollars, the British felt impelled to fight to change 
the existing circumstances of diplomatic and commercial intercourse be-
tween themselves and the Chinese. 
By 1842 China was defeated and was forced to agree to the so-called 
"equal" treaties with Britain. These stipulated in more exact terms how 
1 Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, London, 
1910, I, 565. 
• Ibid. 
• "Letter From Mr. Williams," October 25 1854 The Missionary Herald LI ( March 
1855), 70. ' ' ' 
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commerce should be regulated, how diplomatic intercourse should be main-
tained, and required that several new ports on the China coast should be 
opened to trade. Taking advantage of Britain's success, other Western 
nations, including the United States, soon demanded and obtained treaties 
of their own from the Chinese. 
Almost as an afterthought this First Treaty Settlement, as it was called, 
made it possible for Christian missionaries to reside and preach in the ports 
opened to trade. Thus, in a very real sense, the extended development of 
Protestantism in China after 1842 came as a secondary result of the suc-
cessful aggression of Great Britain. That this fact has not been lost upon 
succeeding generations of Chinese is evidenced by the judgement of the 
Chinese Communist historian, Tung Chi-ming, who commented in 1959 
that the foreign missionaries were the "companions of merchandise and 
opium."4 If for no other reason than this unfortunate association with West-
ern imperialism in the minds of the Chinese, the propagation of Christianity 
was to face serious obstacles in China. 
Protestant missionaries coming to China during the First Treaty Period 
were a dynamic lot and were determined that their cause was right. They 
believed, without reservation, that they had come to China to do "nothing 
less than . . . convert from paganism . . . all the inhabitants of this em-
pire."5 They felt charged to "pluck brands from the burning, to stay the 
plague of eternal death, to set at liberty the prisoners of despair, to save 
the lost, to take the children of darkness . . . and to make them sons of 
God and heirs of glory and happiness everlasting."6 
Despite this dedication the task which they set for themselves proved to 
be far more difficult than anticipated. Unhappily the messengers of the 
Protestant God found themselves facing innumerable problems which, in 
sum, limited their ability to achieve their announced goals. 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem faced by those who desired "to 
save the lost" was to be that of numbers among their own kind. How many 
persons would be required to carry out the full conversion of the Chinese, 
and to keep them, after conversion, from backsliding? Commenting on this 
in June 1842, Dr. Bridgman noted that the population of China was around 
360,000,000. Assuming that there should be one pastor for each 500 com-
municants, he estimated that 6,600,000 recruits would be required to fulfill 
the task in China. 7 
• Tung Chi-ming, An Outline History of China, Peking, 1959, p. 217. 
• "Letter From Mr. Bridgman," June 24, 1842, The Missionary Herald, XXXIX 
( February 1843), 55. 
• Ibid., p. 56. 
1 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
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Unfortunately, for the Protestant cause, this vast number of Christian 
teachers and ministers was unavailable, and only a bare handful answered 
the call. Figures indicate that by 1858 only 213 Protestant missionaries, 
plus their families ( making a total of probably no more than 1,000 persons) , 
had come to China to engage in the great endeavor. About half of these 
were Americans. 8 
But the paucity of numbers arriving in China does not tell the whole 
story. Closely related to the numerical problem was that of the physical 
environment in which those who did come found themselves. On the China 
coast in mid-nineteenth century the toll taken in lives among Westerners 
because of natural calamities and disease was high. Disease, especially, 
ravaged the Western community. The missionaries, despite their noble 
cause, were not exempt from its attack. At some posts a man could be alive 
and well one day, wracked with fever the second, and dead the third. 
The full effect of this unhealthy environment upon the missionary en-
deavor is revealed in figures compiled by The Missionary Magazine in 
December 1855. It was reported that up to that date the total number of 
Protestant missionaries sent to China, exclusive of their families, was 188. 
Of this total eighty-six were still in China, seven were absent on account 
of health, three were laboring among the Chinese in California, thirty-two 
were dead, and sixty were retired because of ill health. 
The total number of years of labor performed by the thirty-two mission-
aries who had died in the field were 188, or an average of five and one-
fourth years for each. However, five of these individuals had had an 
aggregate of eighty-four years of service, thus leaving an average of three 
and eleven one-hundredths years for the remaining twenty-seven. Among 
this latter number seven died before they began the study of the language. 
The total number of years of service performed by the sixty who retired 
was 289, an average of four and eight-tenths years for each. However, six 
of these had had an aggregate of eighty-seven years, leaving an average 
of three and seven-tenths for the remaining fifty-four. Deducting three full 
years "from the period of serviceable labor of each missionary, as time spent 
in learning the language," we see that the effective period of labor of each 
missionary averaged less than one year. 0 
Turning from the interrelated problems of numbers and physical envi-
ronment we must now examine the question of what kind of person was 
acceptable as a convert to the Protestant Christian missionary. The answer 
• "List of Protestant Missionaries to the Chinese," The Missionary Magazine, XXXIX 
(August 1859), 287. 
• "Associations On Behalf of China," The Missionary Magazine, XXV (December 
1855), 491. 
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to this reveals a further complication, that of lack of numbers among 
converts. 
The Protestant missionary was determined to accept no Chinese as a 
Christian convert who had not divorced himself completely from his pre-
vious "pagan" existence. Mere theoretical acceptance of the gospel was not 
enough. "Our object," declared the Rev. E. C. Lord in 1848, "is to save 
men's souls." It was not a competition to collect large numbers of converts.10 
This stringent requirement produced two effects. First, although many 
Chinese were interested in Christianity, the actual number of Protestant 
converts was quite small. By the end of the First Treaty Period there were 
probably no more than 1,000 native converts.11 
Second, the convert was set against the accepted standards of life in 
China. Since it was considered sinful to participate in such customs as 
revering one's ancestors or paying honor to the Emperor, the convert stood 
in stark and lonely contrast to society. Even the sanctity of the principle 
of filial piety was attacked when it ran counter to Christian ideals. Thus, 
in one instance, a man was refused baptism because he felt it necessary 
to obey his mother's charge that he keep the family shop open on the Sab-
bath.12 Except for those who were religious fanatics or who were possessed 
of tremendous will power, the obstacles presented were too difficult for 
most Chinese to overcome. 
Another problem which limited the ability of the Protestant missionaries 
to achieve their goals was that of method-how best to present Christianity 
to the Chinese. For one thing there was considerable debate over whether 
or not the faith should be removed from its Western associations. Some 
felt that the Chinese would oppose anything foreign no matter how good 
it was. The only way the religion could succeed, they said, was to "bury" 
the missionary deep in China, far from compromising Western contacts. 
As soon as initial converts were obtained, the missionary should step into 
the background and permit native Christians to continue the work. With 
the stranger removed from view the taint of foreignism would be removed 
and the general populace would accept the faith on its own merits. 
While many accepted the principle of such an idea, they questioned its 
practicality. For one thing, they said, there was little hope that churches 
and mission boards at home would permit loss of control by the missionary. 
10 "Journal of Rev. E. C. Lord," The Baptist Missionary Magazine, XXXIX ( October 
1849), 358. 
11 "List of Protestant Missionaries to the Chinese," The Missionary Magazine, XXXIX 
(August 1858), 287. 
u "Letter of Dr. Macgowan," April 30, 1850, The Missfonary Magazine, XXX ( Oc-
tober 1850), 316. 
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Some doubted whether native converts could maintain Protestant orthodoxy 
without strong leadership, claiming that native Christians left to themselves 
would probably fall into heresy.13 
A second aspect of the debate over method was whether or not secular 
means should be employed to gain spiritual ends. Some argued that secular 
means were justifiable as long as they reached the desired spiritual goal. 
Disagreeing, others held that any activity which removed the missionary 
from preaching the gospel was a waste of time. Thus there was argument 
over the kind of schools which should be established in China. Should the 
curriculum present only religious subjects or should it include secular 
courses such as science and literature? 
There were also questions raised concerning the academic training 
needed by a missionary. Some maintained that the Chinese generally were 
impressed by persons of a scholarly bent, and thus missionaries should have 
the best education possible before going to China.14 
Not all agreed with this view, as is illustrated by a letter written anony-
mously to the editor of the China Mail in 1857. The writer objected to the 
cultivation of the arts and sciences among the Chinese by missionaries since 
that was "not the purpose for which Missionaries had been sent. . . ." They 
had one purpose only: "Teaching the Gospel." Anyone doing otherwise was 
"unfaithful to his charge and unworthy of the confidence reposed in him." 
Also it was contrary to the example of Christ's apostles who, the writer 
alleged, were simple men. One apostle, he declared, "ignorant of the arts 
and sciences," could do more than any "score of modern Missionaries with 
their knowledge of both."15 
Medical practice was another secular means used to attain spiritual ends. 
Few, if any, missionaries opposed medicine as such, but there was a differ-
ence of opinion concerning its exact status in the scheme of things. Often, 
medical men came close to concluding that healing the Chinese of their ills 
was an end in itself. The doctors seemed more preoccupied with performing 
their Christian duty for suffering man than they were with Christian 
evangelism.16 
Non-medical missionaries generally considered the curative nature of 
medicine less important. To them the patients who came for medical treat-
ment were potential converts. Therefore, while they were waiting to see the 
doctor, they became a captive audience for Christian preaching. Religious 
18 "Ningpo Mission," The Missionary Magazine, XXXII (July 1852), 268. 
""Letter of Mr. Dean," undated, The Missionary Magazine, XXXI (May 1851 ), 
129-130. 
•• The China Mail, September 12, 1857, p. 27. 
19 The China Mail, February 27, 1857, p. 35. 
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services were held daily in all wards, and tracts and portions of Scripture 
were distributed to those visiting the out-patient clinics. Someone waiting 
in line for treatment would often be asked to discuss a tract with a mis-
sionary; or better yet, he would be called upon to memorize it. Usually the 
Chinese endured this harassment with mild good humor. 
Whether some mission boards would have supported pure medical treat-
ment, without a corresponding dose of the gospel, is questionable. There 
is evidence that the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
was disturbed by the fact that their medical missionary, Dr. Peter Parker, 
was treating Western as well as Chinese patients. Apparently the Board did 
not favor dispensing medicine where it would do no good, Westerners, of 
course, already being Christian.17 
Living in the real world was a major problem for the missionaries and 
was a further limitation upon their endeavors. Christianity had to be viewed 
through the reality of secularism, a condition which displayed more of the 
degradation of man than his elevation. How was this problem to be met? 
Although Christianity is a universal religion, free from any particular 
national or cultural affiliation, its introduction into China came as a by-
product of the aggression of Western nations. The Chinese naturally asso-
ciated Christianity with the hated imperialists. Few were able to differen-
tiate one foreigner and his motives from another. In the words of the 
Rev. Dr. Macgowan, the Chinese were "slow to perceive or acknowledge 
any superior excellence in the religion of the authors of their calamities." 
It was difficult to explain away the fact that some of the "bitterest ingre-
dients in this people's cup of misery" had been "administered by Christian 
hands."18 
Some missionaries attempted to explain this paradox by arguing it was 
God's will for the Chinese to suffer. This attitude is best seen in a letter 
written by William Marcy to his missionary board in June 1856. He was 
certain that "war and violence in themselves tend only to evil," and that a 
people "cannot by fire, famine and sword be made to love." However, with-
out noticing the contradiction in his words, he went on to say that the 
"fruits of War" would not cause "increased bitterness," but would instead 
generate "a readiness to listen to and weigh the message of the gospel."19 
17 E. C. Bridgman to Rufus Anderson, January 29, 1846, American Board of Com-
missioners for Foreign Missions Papers (henceforth ABCFM ), File 16.3.8, South China 
Mission, II, Houghton Library, Harvard University (henceforth HLHU). 
18 "Semi-Annual Letter From The Mission," January 1, 1840, The Missionary Herald, 
XXXVI (August 1840), 318. 
10 William Marcy to Rufus Anderson, June 8, 1856, ABCFM, File 16.3.8, South 
China Mission, II, HLHU. 
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On the subject of strife missionary thinking sometimes slipped from the 
theological to the political. It was only a short step from the idea that God 
was causing the strife in China to fulfill His own aims to a justification 
of those who brought the strife. Thus, in some cases, missionaries defended 
the aggressive actions of their respective nations. A graphic example of 
this kind of "doublethink" can be found in a letter written in 1840 by the 
Rev. Dr. J. L. Shuck to the American Baptist Missionary Union describing 
a British attack upon the barrier forts protecting the port of Canton. "I 
deprecate war in all its forms, but the Chinese government is hostile . . . 
to God and to . . . his Son, and it would be no great cause of regret to me 
were the whole fabric soon to fall . . . before the face of offended heaven. 
The number of Chinese killed or wounded yesterday . . . must have been 
three or four hundred; while of the British not a man was killed, and only 
a few slightly wounded." Mr. Shuck concluded with the magnificent state-
ment, "God knows those who are his."20 
Once this state of mind was reached, a few missionaries took it upon 
themselves to help generate this allegedly God-directed strife. Thus during 
the Taiping rebellion, which lasted through the 1850's and early 1860's, and 
which was thought, for a time, to be Christian oriented, some gave sub-
stantive aid to the rebels. Although their assistance helped lay waste vast 
areas of China, they felt they were doing God's work by helping to pull 
down the godless and pagan Imperial government of China. 
Not all missionaries acted in this manner, but enough did to create 
strained relations between the Chinese government and Western powers. 
More than once the Imperial government protested to Western diplomats 
pointing out that their respective nationals were interfering illegally in the 
internal affairs of China. In 1853 Humphrey Marshall, American commis-
sioner to China, was requested by the authorities at Shanghai "to restrain 
American citizens from trading with the insurgents in firearms and ammuni-
tion." Among those so engaged, it was noted, were some American mis-
sionaries. They had not only delivered munitions to the rebels, but also they 
had given rebel officers information on the disposition of Imperial forces 
and had aided in reorganizing the rebel army.21 
Chagrined by this embarrassing report, Marshall wrote an incisive note 
to one of the missionaries involved, the Rev. I. J. Roberts, instructing him 
in no uncertain terms what his responsibilities were as a foreigner in China. 
He threatened Roberts with arrest and imprisonment if he did not cease his 
20 
"Extracts From A Letter of Mr. Shuck," August 20, 1840, The Baptist Missionary 
Magazine, XXI (April 1841), 91. 
21 Correspondence between the State Department and the late Commissioners to 
China, 33rd Congress, 1st session, July 19, 1854, series no. 734, House Executive Docu-
ment no. 123, p. 101. 
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subversive activities. Concluding, the comm1ss10ner remarked: "The in-
temperate zeal or the improper interference with politics of Christian mis-
sionaries, in past centuries, closed the eastern empires of China and Japan 
against intercourse with western nations. Just emerging from their pro-
tracted 'seclusion' it would be most unfortunate . . . that the first display 
before the eyes of China and Japan should be the torch of civil war, lighted 
upon the altars of their country by Christian teachers of religion."22 
A final aspect of the problem of the missionaries' relation to the real 
world is found in the difficulties which they had to face when they were 
called upon by non-religious agencies to perform tasks beneficial to the 
entire Western community on the China coast. For instance, requests some-
times were made to them by their respective governments for assistance in 
carrying on diplomatic affairs with China. Because of their long experience 
in the area, their many contacts with the people, and their knowledge of 
the language, they were singularly suited for such work. Besides this, their 
apparent lack of vested interest and high moral character caused their gov-
ernments to place greater trust in them than in representatives of more 
secular institutions in China. 
The United States, especially, often called upon American missionaries 
for assistance, asking for help in translation of documents passing between 
the American and Chinese governments. Since Congress had appropriated 
no money for interpreters, often they were the only persons available to 
assist American diplomatic envoys who usually did not know the Chinese 
language. Without missionary help little official business could have oc-
curred between the United States and China. 
Unquestionably, the utility of such activities was high, but many mis-
sionaries were uncertain as to whether or not such employment might com-
promise their high calling. This uneasiness is found in a letter written in 
1859 by the Rev. Samuel W. Bonney to his mission board in which he 
reports that he had been asked by the American consul at Canton for aid 
in translation and interpreting. He had complied with the consul's request, 
accommodating him "when it did not interfere with my duties at the 
Chapel. . . ." Bonney assured his board that his job was only temporary 
and that he "would not think of doing this service . . . if • • . an inter-
preter could now be obtained outside the missionary circle." To assuage 
any fears that he might be compromised by tainted money, he made it 
quite plain that he was turning over all fees received for his services to 
the mission treasury. 2a 
22 Ibid. 
•• Samuel W. Bonney to Rufus Anderson, September 8, 1839, ABCFM, File 16.3.8, 
South China Mission, II, HLHU. 
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A few missionaries were not as disturbed as Bonney by the prospect of 
association with a secular agency such as the diplomatic service. They justi-
fied their position by stating that they were accomplishing as much by 
establishing peaceful relations between China and their respective nations 
as they were by preaching in the pulpit. Such a stand was likely to create 
trouble for the individual, however. 
A classic case is that of the Rev. Dr. Peter Parker, medical missionary 
for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. From 1842 
until 1857 he served respectively as negotiator and translator for the Cush-
ing mission, which negotiated the first American treaty with China in 1842, 
and as secretary and translator for the American legation, charge d'affaires, 
acting commissioner, and finally commissioner of the United States to 
China, the highest diplomatic post an American could hold in China at the 
time. 
During the Cushing mission Dr. Parker had distinguished himself as an 
able interpreter and adviser. Thus, in 1845, he was offered the part-time 
post of secretary and interpreter to the American legation in China. When 
he accepted the position, however, he was promptly fired from his mis-
sionary status by the American Board which considered his new job, al-
though it would have required little time, as being incompatible with its 
religious aims. Having lived in China as a missionary since 1834, Dr. Parker 
was greatly surprised and saddened to be "suddenly and unexpectedly 
deprived of a foundation for support as permanent, I suppose as anything 
earthly could be." While regretting his removal he defended his decision, 
claiming he was performing his Christian duty by helping to create friend-
lier relations between his nation and China. 24 
Dr. Parker soon found himself under attack by his former associates. 
Questioning his honor one missionary wrote that "missionaries . . . are in 
a position so honorable that they must go down in the scale of true honor 
in accepting whatever post of employment besides." This descent from 
honor could "rarely be made without an injury to the individual and the 
cause with which he is connected."25 Mrs. Parker also was in line for criti-
cism, with one missionary writing in 1848 that probably the dismissed mis-
sionary's "present situation is more agreeable to Mrs. Parker ... than 
that of a missionary's wife." She was, he noted, "a woman of too much 
refinement and elegance" to be a "humble missionary's wife."26 
"'Peter Parker to the Prudential Committee of the American Board, January 1846, 
ABCFM, File 16.3.3, Amoy Mission, I, HLHU. 
•• William Marcy to Rufus Anderson, May 8, 1857, ABCFM, File 16.3.8, South 
China Mission, II, HLHU. 
•• Samuel W. Bonney to Rufus Anderson, February 7, 1848, ibid. 
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While acting in his diplomatic capacity, Dr. Parker was embarrassed 
occasionally by his former colleagues. Once, in 1850, he was invited to a 
party given in honor of the British governor of Hong Kong. However, pre-
sumably because alcoholic beverages would be served, Dr. Parker was 
informed by his friends that if he went to the affair they would "consider 
that he had degraded his clerical character," and they would refuse to 
receive the sacraments from him. Although disassociated officially from the 
missionary community, Dr. Parker was still a minister of the Gospel and 
a deeply religious man. Thus the representative of the United States sent 
the British governor his regrets and did not attend the party, not wanting 
to offend his friends.27 
In summary it may be said that Protestant missionaries had great hopes 
that following the opening of China to Western intercourse in the 1840's 
the conversion of that country to Christianity would follow soon after. How-
ever, these hopes were not realized. The minute size of the Protestant 
legions and the unforeseen complications which limited their effectiveness, 
frustrated efforts to evangelize all of China. 
Long before 1860 it was recognized that the First Treaty Period was 
merely the initial phase of a long and tedious struggle. This, the mission-
aries concluded, was the seed time rather than the harvest. Commenting 
on this the Rev. Dr. Bonney wrote: "I have come into a new uncultivated 
country as it were, among the tall trees of superstition, ignorance and idol-
atry." These were enormous trees and he could as yet "only peck at the 
bark with a small hatchet." Despite this handicap he was convinced that 
given enough time and vigorous chopping his hatchet would topple the 
entire forest.28 His confidence was echoed by the rest of his Protestant com-
patriots who still looked forward to final victory over paganism in China. 
27 John Heard to George W. Heard, April 1, 1850, Heard Papers, Baker Library, 
Harvard University. 
•• Samuel W. Bonney to Rufus Anderson, February 4, 1847, ABCFM, File 16.3.8, 
South China Mission, II, HLHU. 
FRENCH COMMUNISM AND THE NON-COMMUNIST 
INTELLECTUALS, 1949 
FREDERICK F. RITSCH 
Many political observers of the French Fourth Republic, deploring the 
immobilism of the republican parties, have tended to promote an image 
or "myth" of the political superiority of French Communism. As a result, 
the intellectuals of the non-communist Left, the amorphous political sector 
that existed between French Communism and French Socialism, have too 
often suffered from an adverse image. According to this, the non-communist 
intellectuals, blinded by their faith in Marxism and craving a socialist 
utopia, were natural and easy prey for the communists. This image is grossly 
misleading, for by the end of 1948, French Communism and the non-com-
munist intellectuals were, as a result of differing reactions to the rapidly 
intensifying Cold War, embarking upon divergent ideological roads. These 
fundamental differences were finally clarified when, during the first months 
of 1949, concern over the Atlantic Pact led the communists to raise the 
question of an alliance of the Party and the intellectuals. At this decisive 
point, all suggestions of the intellectuals' subservience to communism were 
dispelled, while considerable doubt was cast upon the Communist Party's 
image of political superiority. The purpose of this paper is to examine in 
some detail the evolution of the political attitudes and actions that resulted 
ultimately in creating an ideological wall between the French Communists 
and the French non-communist intellectuals. 
The year 1948 brought severe tests for the French Communists; their 
efforts to stem the westward drift of French foreign policy had been com-
pletely unsuccessful, and had, instead, provoked a powerful anti-communist 
reaction from the republican parties. Communist propaganda had concen-
trated upon the economic distress of France, the dangers of German re-
vival, and the loss of national independence; indeed, the Party had striven 
to associate the danger of a third world war with American aggressiveness 
toward the Soviet Union. It was a downhill struggle, since the actions of 
Soviet Russia supplied a constant stream of ammunition for the anti-com-
munist forces: the formation of the Comintern in October 1947, the Czech-
oslovakian coup d'etat, the suicide of Jan Masaryk, and the Berlin Blockade 
all contributed to the mounting unpopularity of communism in France. 
What was needed was a dynamic new strategy, a strategy which would 
restore the Party's prestige, and would at the same time enable communism 
to rally to itself the French Left. By autumn, increasing speculation con-
cerning an impending Atlantic alliance system made a new communist 
strategy absolutely essential. 
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Rumors of an anti-communist Atlantic alliance had been rife in France 
since the summer of 1948; by October, the virtues and risks of such an 
alliance were being freely discussed. Certainly it is difficult today to imag-
ine the magnitude of concern aroused by the Atlantic Pact. Along with 
the Marshall Plan, it was the most significant diplomatic development of 
the immediate European post-war period. For Frenchmen, it involved a 
vital decision, since acceptance did signify, as the communists persistently 
charged, the final step in the creation of an anti-communist Western bloc. 
While to most republicans of the Center and Right the alliance appeared as 
an effective deterrent to Soviet imperialism, others, especially those of the 
Left, feared the intentions of the United States. 
Since January 1948 one of the most consistent communist propaganda 
themes had been the "war-scare," the concentration on the destructive pos-
sibilities of a third world war. Toward the end of summer, this line under-
went a change in emphasis: communists now raised the issue of means for 
preventing war, while the "war-scare" propaganda pictured war as an im-
mediate danger.1 By October, the communist intention was evident: having 
failed to create an image of the Party as defender of national interests 
against foreign encroachments, the communists were now preparing to 
present the Party as the citadel and hope for peace.2 Then, in December, 
it was proclaimed that henceforth the Party's major slogan would be "Unity 
for Peace.''3 
The communist "peace" offensive did not assume the proportions of a 
mass movement until March 1949. In the meantime, the Party intensified 
its "imminent war" propaganda; this was a period of "softening" the public, 
and probably reflected a belief that response to a "peace" movement would 
be greater, and consequently, its propaganda value enhanced, if the public 
could be convinced of a real risk of war inherent in the Atlantic Alliance. 
Communist and pro-communist polemicists took every advantage of the 
general concern over the Pact: such proclamations as "the plans for an 
imperialistic war are avowed,"4 and "the Marshall Plan is a war plan,"5 are 
representative of the daily statements found in the official Party journal, 
I'Humanite. In February, the Politburo set forth its strongest criticism of 
1 See statement of Maurice Thorez to central committee, l'Humanite, July 9, 1948. 
• For an example of this propaganda, see the speech of Alain le Leap, secretary-
general of the communist-dominated Confederation Generale du Travail, in l'Hu-
manite, October 13, 1948. 
• Etienne Fajon, l'Humanite, December 14, 1948. The emphasis on peace was a 
major feature of Moscow's anti-American strategy for combatting the Atlantic Pact; 
thus, in each Western European country, the communists promoted the peace theme. 
However, it was the French Party that organized the most impressive "peace" campaign. 
• L'Humanite, January 10, 1949. 
• L'Humanite, January 11, 1949. 
16 THE SouTH CAROLINA H1sTORICAL AssoCIATION 
European unity and the Atlantic Pact: "Western Union constitutes an 
instrument for the preparation of war against the countries of socialism 
and the popular democracies. . . . The Atlantic Pact is directed by Anglo-
American imperialists who are under the direction of the U. S. and have 
the goal of world domination."6 
This type of propaganda reached its peak at the February 22 central 
committee meeting, when Party leader and secretary, Maurice Thorez, 
charged that "the French Government is actively collaborating with the 
aggressive Anglo-Saxon imperialists." Thorez went on to warn that, in the 
event of an anti-Soviet war, Frenchmen would welcome an invading Soviet 
army.7 This threatening declaration produced an immediate reaction in 
France. While the communist and crypto-communist press praised the 
speech, non-communists charged the Party secretary with treason. In the 
National Assembly there was an attempt to oust Thorez and censure the 
Party.8 
Undaunted, the communists now inaugurated their "peace" movement, 
which would, according to Thorez, "galvanize all adherents of peace in all 
countries" behind Russia. 9 Alain le Leap immediately pledged the support 
of the French working class. The workers, claimed le Leap, "know that the 
danger of war cannot come from the Soviet Union."10 
The "peace" campaign evolved rapidly and took the form of communist-
organized mass meetings composed almost entirely of working class audi-
ences. The initial gathering was held on March 2 at the Velodr6me d'Hiver 
in Paris, where a great crowd of workers was harangued for hours by the 
Party leaders. They were called upon to join the "battle for peace," and 
l'Humanite headlined the meeting with "Paris says NO to an anti-Soviet 
war."11 Liberation, the most pro-communist of the major non-communist 
journals, enthusiastically praised the event. The Liberation correspondent 
Marcel Fourrier wrote: "The USSR pursues a policy of peace." The Russian 
foreign policy, he continued, "has always been dominated by her desire 
for entente with the United States. . . . This is . . . very clear, except to 
those who fear clarity."12 
• L'Humanite, February 4, 1949. 
• L'Humanite, February 23, 1949. See also, Les Cahiers du Communisme, Paris, 
March 1949, no. 3, p. 274. 
• See Annals de l'Assemblee nationale, Debdts, Paris, February 24, 1949, pp. 877f. 
• L'Humanite, February 26, 1949. 
10 Ibid. 
11 L'Humanite, March 3, 1949. See also, Jacques Duclos, "Pour la defense de la Paix, 
l'Heurre est aux Grandes Audacesl" Les Cahiers du Communisme, March 1949, no. 3, 
pp. 275-288. 
'"Liberation, Paris, March 3, 7, 1949. 
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The communists had always aspired to draw the intellectuals of the 
non-communist Left into the Party. The non-communist Left had appeared 
at the end of World War II in the political no-man's land between French 
Communism and French Socialism. In the 1945 to 1948 period, the non-
communist Left, composed of such diverse elements as crypto-communists, 
disillusioned SFIO socialists, intellectuals, and left-wing Catholics, was held 
together only by the common desire of its adherents to bring about a pop-
ular front reconciliation between communism and socialism, and thereby 
re-establish the solidarity of the Left. Yet, this political sector was divided 
within itself as to whether solidarity should be rebuilt around a revitalized 
French Socialism or around the Communist Party. 
The most influential elements of the non-communist Left were certain 
small groups of intellectuals who, for theoretical reasons, could not reject 
communism ( it was the working class party), and, for personal reasons, 
preferred French Socialism ( it was more French and democratic). The 
publications of these intellectuals were important. The monthly periodicals 
Esprit, edited by Emmanuel Mounier, the founder of Personalism, and 
Les Temps Mode-rnes, directed by existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, were, 
along with Claude Bourdet's daily journal Combat, widely read and influ-
ential among intellectual and student circles.13 
From 1944 to 1947, these intellectuals demonstrated great optimism in 
the potential of French Communism to unite the Left and carry out a 
socialist revolution. For them, the Second World War was the conclusive 
proof of the decadence and impotence of the European bourgeoisie; the 
future now belonged to dynamic socialism, which would ensure social and 
economic justice and peace. Communism had the intellectual' s admiration 
because of its virility, discipline, sense of historic mission, and most impor-
tant, because the Party had the allegiance of the working class.14 Steeped 
in Marxist beliefs, the non-communist intellectuals were convinced that 
revolutionary strength resided only in the proletariat. Thus, even though 
most of the intellectuals deplored the totalitarian tendencies of the Party, 
they accepted the rule that "everyone must remember that any blow di-
rected at the Party hits at the core of the faith of the [working class].''15 
13 The estimated circulation of Combat in 1949 was 69,000; for comparison Le Pop-
ulaire, the official SFIO journal, had an estimated 36,000 daily circulation in 1949. See 
Alexander Werth, France: 1940-1955, New York, 1956, p. 736. Both Esprit and Les 
Temps Modernes underwent rapid circulation increases after 1947, and outstripped the 
communist Les Cahiers du Communisme and the SFIO La Revue Socialiste. See 
Georges Suffert, Les Catholiques et la Gauche, Paris, 1960, pp. 122-125, and Philip 
Thody, Jean-Paul Sartre: A Literary and Political Study, New York, 1960, pp. 193-194. 
"See Emmanuel Mounier, Oeuvres: Recueils posthumes, Correspondance, Paris, 
1963, IV, 118-119. 
15 Emmanuel Mounier, "Debat a Haute Voix," Esprit, Paris, February 1947, no. 122, 
p. 166. 
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The ultimate goal of these intellectuals was a Europe united under 
socialism and acting as the primary world force for peace. However, the 
increased tempo of the Cold War during 1947 clouded optimism for peace 
and socialism. On the one hand, the Marshall Plan seemed designed to 
restore European capitalism in order to halt the growth of socialism; on 
the other hand, the establishment of the Comintern, the Czech coup, and 
the slavish obedience of the French Party to Soviet dictates aroused fears 
as to Russian intentions and thus reduced faith in communism. By the end 
of 1947, most intellectuals had discarded their belief in communism as 
the unifying force of the Left, and now appealed to French Socialism 
( SFIO) to adopt a posture of "independent strength."16 But the SFIO had 
firmly committed itself to the Marshall Plan, and the intellectuals, frus-
trated, were soon bitterly complaining that French Socialism was playing 
the "follies of the Radical-Socialist Party."17 Throughout 1948, the intel-
lectuals frantically sought a third alternative to either a Western or an 
Eastern orientation for France and Western Europe. An attempt by the 
Les Temps Modernes element to form a new leftist political party, the 
Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionnaire (RDR), found little support 
even among the non-communist Left.18 As the months passed and France 
moved steadily toward the Western bloc, the intellectuals retreated into 
neutralism and pacifism. In December, the journal Franc-Tireur set aside a 
"Week of Peace," and featured a series of peace appeals by such prom-
inent leftists as Albert Camus, David Rousset, Andre Breton, and Jean-Paul 
Sartre.19 Significantly, the non-communist intellectuals and the French 
Communists were converging on the theme of peace. 
By January 1949, the usually divided intellectuals of the non-com-
munist Left were in agreement on two points. First, they considered the 
European unification movement that had evolved since the Marshall Plan 
to be a parody of their aspirations for an independent Europe federated 
under socialism. As Marcel Gimont observed after the creation of the 
Council of Europe in January 1949: "We do not have the Europe we wished 
for, rather a 'pax Americana.' "20 Second, the intellectuals were now con-
vinced that neutralism was the only course for France and Western Europe 
to follow. The concept of neutralism was certainly not new to the non-
10 Claude Bourdet, Combat, Paris, October 14, 1947. 
17 David Rousset and Jean-Paul Sartre, "Entretien sur la Politique," Les Temps 
Modernes, Paris, July 1948, no. 33, p. 389. 
18 For the aims and purposes of the RDR, see Jean-Paul Sartre, David Rousset, and 
Gerard Rosenthal, Entretiens sur l,a Politique, Paris, 1949. Also, Thody, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
pp. 196ff. 
10 See Franc-Tireur, Paris, December 7 to December 16, 1948. 
•• Combat, January 27, 1949. 
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communist Left; what was new was the urgency attached to the idea. For 
example, Georges Altmann, fearing the consequences of the Atlantic Pact, 
pleaded with the government to adopt a policy of "active and dynamic 
neutralism . . . in order to assure independence from war."21 
However, if there was general agreement that neutralism was necessary, 
there was vast difference of opinion as to what kind of neutralism was most 
desirable. Many were impressed by the communist "war-scare" propaganda, 
and, by February, were agreeing with the Party that the Marshall Plan, 
Western Union, and the Atlantic Pact were all steps leading toward an 
American-initiated anti-Soviet war. According to Sartre and David Rousset, 
"atomic war can be averted only by the United States not directing war." 
These two men suspected the United States had already determined that 
war was necessary, and that the only reason war had not yet begun was 
the great expense involved. Europe could escape being a battleground only 
by a sort of accommodation with Russia: the leaders of France must "pro-
claim neutrality immediately and without delay." In this way peace could 
be achieved because "around a neutral France, a European socialism would 
become finally possible and acceptable to the communists."22 
The Esprit group, also impressed by the communist propaganda, ap-
proached the situation more calmly than those associated with Les Temps 
Modernes. Emmanuel Mounier and his colleagues admitted that the Pact 
was aggressively anti-communist, but they did not feel the danger of war 
was immediate. Still, they believed that, in the long run, the peace of Eu-
rope would be endangered; consequently, Esprit urged the rejection of the 
Pact and a reversal in the direction of the European unity movement. At 
the same time, Esprit scorned the idea that Western Europe must develop 
in a way acceptable to the Russians. Instead, Europe should adopt a policy 
of pacifism and neutralism, and this neutralism must be preserved through 
strength. Western Europe must undergo an economic recovery and then 
re-arm. Once this had been accomplished, Western Europe would stand as 
an armed camp between the United States and Soviet Russia, and could 
act as guardian of world peace.23 The Esprit proposal was seconded by 
Claude Bourdet, who had always believed in a neutralism that would per-
mit Europe to be "strong but independent."24 
21 Franc-Tireur, November 30, 1948. 
•• Etiemble, "De la Bombe Atomique et de ses Consequences," Les Temps Modernes, 
February 1949, no. 40, p. 297. 
•• See issue entitled "Revision des Pacifisme," Esprit, February 1949, no. 153, espe-
cially the articles of Frank Emmanuel ( "Le Pacifisme des Forts") and Emmanuel Mou-
nier ( "Les :l!:quivoques du Paciflsme"). 
•• Combat, March 16, 1949. 
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The official announcement of the Pact in March, and its subsequent sign-
ing in Washington on April 4, appeared to have greater effect upon the 
non-communist Left than any other event since the end of the war; reac-
tions ranged from near-hysteria to utter disillusionment. To Claude Bourdet, 
the signing of the Pact marked the end of a dream he had long cherished: 
"There is no longer ... a United States of Europe to envisage-only the 
European extension of the United States of America."25 Bourdet's colleague 
at Combat, Marcel Gimont, now found himself agreeing with the com-
munists that the "Atlantic aggressor Pact" was designed to make "West 
Germany the arsenal of the Atlantic coalition."26 Gimont wondered if the 
Pact, the Marshall Plan, and the Council of Europe could all have had the 
single aim of bringing a militarily revived Germany into the anti-Soviet 
bloc? If this were the case, the danger of war was very real.27 The Les 
Temps Modernes staff had no doubts on this last point. The passage of the 
Pact indicated that a war was inevitable unless France acted at once: "If 
France declares without delay [her] neutrality, following in this the 
examples of Sweden and Switzerland, she will be imitated by the others 
[European states]."28 
As usual, the most judicious observation came from Esprit. Here, there 
was an effort to examine objectively the whole problem of the Cold War in 
order to understand the significance of the Pact. Both Russia and the United 
States, Esprit observed, were guilty of fostering expansionist plans. The 
Russian plan was "military," and was founded upon Soviet fear of war 
and encirclement by capitalist powers. The American plan was "financial," 
and based on fear that Western Europe would fall under Soviet control. 
Reasoning that an economically revived Western Europe would withstand 
communism, the United States had confronted Russia with a financial offen-
sive, the Marshall Plan. Later, the Americans had decided this was not 
adequate, that a great defensive alliance was necessary. The Atlantic Pact 
had been conceived in order to meet this need. The Russians, for their part, 
had interpreted each American move as another proof that the capitalists 
were intent upon a war against the Soviet Union. Although Russia did not 
desire war, continued Esprit, the creation of the Atlantic Alliance might 
well bring the Soviet fears to such a peak that Russia would decide a defen-
sive war necessary. Therefore, the most logical course for France and 
Europe was, as Esprit had earlier suggested, pacifism and neutralism with 
•• Combat, April 5, 1949. 
•• See l'Humanite, March 26, 1949. 
27 Combat, April 1, 1949. 
•• P. Laurie, "La Logique des Fous," Les Temps Modernes, April 1949, no. 42, 
p. 728. 
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strength.29 One interesting sidelight here was a suggestion by Joseph Rou-
van that perhaps France and Germany could resolve their differences, and 
unite in the common effort to preserve peace. 30 
As frustrations and fears increased during March and April, the intel-
lectuals tended to look favorably on the communist "peace" movement. 
\Vhat they admired was the mass character of the campaign. For example, 
Jean-Paul Sartre suggested that the movement might well be the only means 
of arousing the public to preserve peace.31 Therefore, it was not surprising 
when, in April, the Communist Party, seeking allies, initiated an all-out 
effort to convince the non-communist intellectuals to associate with the 
"peace" movement. Success in this endeavor would lend enormous prestige 
to the movement, and could bring about a virtual capture of the influential 
non-communist Left. Hence, a strong appeal was made, an appeal which 
was directed toward those principles and ideals which the intellectuals had 
been so ardently proclaiming since the war: defense of the working class, 
anti-capitalism, unity of the Left, and, above all, peace. Maurice Thorez 
declared that "we [the Party] unite with you in peace."32 The pro-com-
munist journal Cahiers Internationaux urged the intellectuals to join in the 
"struggle for liberty,"33 and crypto-communist Marcel Fourrier warned that 
peace could be assured only by the "union of workers and men of ideas."34 
To many observers, communist and non-communist, the time-spring of 
1949-had never seemed more propitious for an alliance of the Party and the 
non-communist intellectuals. Yet, by summer, the possibilities for such an 
alliance were never more remote, and it was French Communism that had 
to bear the responsibility for the altered situation_. By April 1949, the intel-
lectuals had reached conclusions that were for them basic and absolutely 
essential if Europe were to maintain independence of action and avoid 
being drawn into a war. First, France and Western Europe must assume 
a neutral role between East and West. The intellectuals had come to view 
the Cold War as a struggle between two ideologies, American capitalism 
and Soviet communism, both of which sought the domination of Europe. 
This led to a second conclusion: France and Europe must reject both an-
tagonistic ideologies in favor of social democracy, which was the only 
•• See editorial in special issue "Le Pacte Atlantique," Esprit, May 1949, no. 155, 
pp. 581-590. 
30 Joseph Rouvan, "L'Allemagne de nos Merites," ibid., p. 677. 
31 See editorial in Les Temps Modernes, April 1949, no. 42. 
32 For the complete text of Thorez' speech, delivered on April 19, see Les Cahiers 
du Communisme, May 1949, no. 5, pp. 623-646. 
•• See Lelio Borso, "Lutte contre la Guerre, Lutte pour la Liberte," Cahiers lnter-
nationaux, Paris, May 1949, no. 5, pp. 5-14. 
•• Liberation, April 30, 1949. 
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alternative that would permit Europe to develop independently and peace-
fully. The French Communists understood none of this. In their view, the 
hostility between East and West required a clear and unqualified choice 
between the United States and Soviet Russia; a third position rejecting both 
the United States and Russia was inconceivable. Consequently, even as 
they were striving to absorb the non-communist Left, the French Com-
munists were alienating the intellectuals by completely excluding the pos-
sibility of a third, a European, alternative. 
Thus, communist J. M. Hermann, striking at the intellectuals' faith in 
a European Socialism, declared "any internationalism other than socialism 
as exemplified by the USSR is false."35 Leading communist intellectual, 
Laurent Casanova, after ridiculing both the idea of a European unity and 
the non-communist intellectuals' hopes for a European neutrality, concluded 
that "the touchstone of true internationalism is the attitude with regard to 
the Soviet Union."36 The mistake of the Party was to assume that the dis-
illusioned and war-frightened intellectuals had no choice except alliance 
with French Communism. It was this conviction that led Maurice Thorez 
to make a serious, perhaps decisive, blunder. Speaking before the National 
Conference of the Communist Party on April 10, Thorez declared categori-
cally that there was no room in either the "peace" campaign or the Party 
for neutralists. In fact, he said, the "peace" movement was open only to 
those who recognized that support of the policies of the Soviet Union was 
the sole means of preserving peace. Then, in bitter terms, Thorez de-
nounced the idea of armed neutrality, and labelled Bourdet and Mounier 
as "idealists" who gave lip-service to Marxism, but who demonstrated their 
lack of conviction in true Marxism by their criticisms of Soviet policies.37 
The intellectuals reacted with equal fervor. They were angered not so 
much by the communist criticism of neutralism as, to quote Emmanuel 
Mounier, by the Party's "ridiculous claim to absolute monopoly of right 
thinking, of right socialism."38 Mounier, whose views on this issue were 
representative of the majority of the non-communist intellectuals, observed 
that Thorez had hardly elected the best method of convincing the intel-
lectuals they should ally with the "peace" movement and the Party. For 
himself, and he believed for others as well, there could never be a narrow 
association with communism as long as the Party remained inflexible and 
•• J. M. Hermann, "Socialisme et Nation," Cahiers Internationaux, March-April 1949, 
nos. 3-4, p. 26. 
•• Laurent Casanova, Le Parti Communi.ste, l.es Intell.ectuels, et la Nation, Paris, 
1951 (1949 edition revised), p . 73. 
•
1 See l'Humanite, April 12, 13, 1949; Les Cahiers du Communisme, May 1949, 
no. 5, pp. 647ff. Also, Esprit, June 1949, no. 156, pp. 849-852. 
•• Ibid. 
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unwilling to compromise within reason.39 Mounier had expressed the prev-
alent opinion; the majority of the non-communist intellectuals firmly re-
jected the communist overtures. Adopting the slogan "neither Washington 
nor Moscow," they continued to assert that neutrality was the only logical, 
sure means of avoiding destruction in a Russo-American war. Of the major 
intellectuals, only Jean-Paul Sartre continued to flirt seriously with com-
munism, and even he would never take the decisive step of joining the 
Party.40 
The failure of the French Communist Party to win over the non-com-
munist intellectuals is significant in underscoring the vital weakness of 
French Communism-its inflexibility. Why did not the Party seek a com-
promise with the intellectuals, when there was every reason to believe that 
compromise would have benefitted communism? ·what the French Party 
and the Russians feared most in 1949 was the arrangement of Western 
Europe into a powerful anti-communist bloc. Consequently, was not a 
neutralist tendency more consistent with Soviet interests than with those of 
the United States? Why then did not the French Party elect to encourage a 
neutralist movement among the French Left? At most, this might have 
seriously weakened France's ties with the Western camp, and, at least, it 
would have thrown the French Socialist Party into confusion. The truth is, 
however, that the French Communist Party could never, of its own volition, 
compromise with the non-communist intellectuals, since to do so would 
endanger its own raison d'etre. As A. Rossi observed in 1948: "When ... 
the Party must choose between French patriotism and Soviet patriotism, 
it chooses the latter-and must choose it, unless it is to deny its essential 
character and the purposes that have called it into being.''41 The French 
Communists were charged with the responsibilities of representing Soviet 
Socialism in France, and of defending the Soviet Union against all possible 
dangers. Thus, the principle "to battle anti-Sovietism is to battle for 
peace,''42 represented the sole position the French Party could assume. 
There could be no middle solution, particularly one that did not recognize 
the absolute "correctness" of the Soviet position. According to Laurent 
Casanova, in order for the non-communist intellectuals to have affiliated 
with the "peace" movement ( which was tantamount to alliance with the 
•• Ibid. 
'
0 It is interesting to note that, while Sartre became increasingly pro-communist, 
his co-founders of the RDR, Rousset and Rosenthal, drifted into anti-communism. 
"A. Rossi (A. Tasca), A Communist Party in Action, London, 1955 (trans. of 
Physiologie du Parli Communiste Frani;;ais, Paris, 1948), p. 242. 
'"Andre Carrel, l'Humanite, February 16, 1949. 
24 THE SouTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL AssoCIATION 
Party), they would first have had to accept the fact that there were but two 
alternatives: "war with capitalism," or "peace with [Russian] socialism.''43 
The intellectuals, however, had concluded that there existed a third alterna-
tive: a neutralism that would avoid choosing either East or West. 
•• Casanova, Le Parti Communiste, p. 135. 
THE CHARLES TOWN BOARD OF POLICE, 1780-1782: 
A STUDY IN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION UNDER 
MILITARY OCCUPATION 
GEORGES. McCowEN, JR. 
In May 1780, the city of Charles Town capitulated to a British force 
under the joint command of Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Marriot Ar-
buthnot after a siege that had lasted for over a month. This event was, 
at the same time, one of the greatest victories for the British in the Amer-
ican Revolution and one of the most disastrous setbacks for the Americans, 
whose entire force of some five thousand men surrendered. Before returning 
to New York to reassume command over the British forces in the North, 
Sir Henry Clinton left instructions with Lord Cornwallis, now the ranking 
officer in the South, for the establishment of a Board of Police at Charles 
Town to be modeled on the one that Clinton had established in New York 
several years previously. The Board was conceived of as a purely tempo-
rary agency to function in the interim between military conquest and the 
re-establishment of normal civil government. Although set up as a judicial 
tribunal to meet the immediate needs of a civil court, the jurisdiction of 
the Board was eventually extended to include many services that had here-
tofore been carried out by the Assembly in South Carolina. Thus in typically 
eighteenth-century fashion, the Board became an organ of mixed juris-
diction. 
As set up initially, the Board was intended to meet the immediate needs 
of the mercantile community for a court to enforce the obligations of con-
tracts. The Board was also to act as an advisory council for the commandant 
of the occupied city and to assist him in every feasible way in his task of 
administering a bustling city under difficult and somewhat chaotic condi-
tions. In this respect, the Board was to serve as a sort of quasi-council, 
quasi-assembly for a military commandant, who was, at the same time, to 
command the British troops in Charles Town and to act as the executive 
authority for His Majesty's loyal subjects as well as His Majesty's disloyal 
rebels. Both commandant and Board were to fill difficult positions in ex-
tremely perilous times. 
The members of the Board of Police were appointed by the British 
commandant and were on the whole a capable lot, whose voice in the 
administration of the city must have done much to reconcile the inhabitants 
of Charles Town to a government by military decree. Certainly this was 
the intention of Lord Cornwallis, who hoped that, by modeling the proce-
dures of the Board as closely as possible on the laws and practices of the 
former civil courts and by appointing as intendants of police prominent 
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members of the pre-revolutionary royal establishment, the local inhabitants 
would reconcile themselves to the extralegal character of the Board.1 
The first head of the Board of Police, known as the intendant general, 
was James Simpson, who had been the last attorney general of South Caro-
lina before the Revolution2 and had served the loyalist cause unreservedly 
during the conflict. Banished from South Carolina in 1777, he had returned 
to the state before the capitulation of Charles Town on a secret mission for 
which he had been commissioned by Sir Henry Clinton to ascertain the 
extent of loyalist sentiment in the state. 3 It was really given to Simpson to 
make of the Board a working organ of administration, and he seems to 
have performed his duties conscientiously and diligently from the time of 
his appointment as intendant general until his departure from the state in 
February 1781. 
Conveniently enough, Lieutenant Governor William Bull arrived in 
Charles Town the day before Simpson left the province for New York. Bull, 
whose integrity and capability as an administrator was acknowledged by 
patriots, as well as loyalists, was immediately appointed to take Simpson's 
place on the Board as intendant general. 4 Aware of the unpopularity that 
his consent to serve might incur to himself and reserved in his own opinion 
as to the effectiveness of such an extraordinary "mode of distributing Jus-
tice" as a Board of Police, Bull wrote to Hillsborough, the secretary of state 
for the Southern Department: "Altho this Office appears to be a kind of deg-
radation, yet where the King's Service can be promoted thereby, I really 
wave every Punctilio, and I have reason to believe that my appearing at that 
Board will in some degree tend to conciliate the confidence of the People, 
and flatter their Hopes of seeing Civil Government soon re-established."0 
In this same letter to Lord Hillsborough, Bull observed that the people of 
the province had been "full of anxious expectation and hopes" that their 
1 Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of his 
Campaigns 1775-1782, with an Appendix of Original Documents, ed. William Bradford 
Willcox, New Haven, 1954, p. 182. 
• W. Roy Smith, South Carolina as a Royal Province, 1719-1776, New York, 1903, 
p. 413. 
• James Simpson to Sir Henry Clinton, August 20, 1779, South Carolina Historical 
Society. The commission appointing Simpson as intendant general, dated June 23, 1780, 
may be found in Miscellaneous Records, South Carolina Archives, SS Part 2, pp. 324-
326. 
' William Bull to Lord Hillsborough, February 16, 1781, Records in the British Pub-
lic Record Office Relating to South Carolina, 1663-1782, South Carolina Archives ( here-
inafter cited as BPRO), XXXVI, 106. Simpson attended 76 sessions of the Board of 
Police from June 1780 to February 1781. Records of the Board of Police, Public Records 
Office, London, microfilm in Library of Congress ( hereinafter cited as RBP), nos. 519-
521. Bull, who replaced him, attended 93 sessions from March 1781 to October 1782. 
RBP, nos. 520-526. 
• William Bull to Lord Hillsborough, February 16, 1781, BPRO, XXXVI, 106. 
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returning lieutenant governor had brought with him authorization from the 
Crown to re-establish civil government in the province. Bull believed that 
nothing else would do so much to "restore and establish the publick tran-
quility on a lasting foundation."6 
The lieutenant governor was anxious for the re-establishment of civil 
government, not only for the public good, but also because at long last 
he hoped to be appointed governor of South Carolina. Bull, who was now 
over seventy, had served as lieutenant governor for many years and had 
been appointed acting governor on three different occasions. In spite of 
his long service and widely acknowledged capability, he had always seen 
his ambitions for the governorship shattered by royal placemen sent over 
from England to fill the top position in South Carolina. He had not given 
up his ambition, however; for after the death of Lord William Campbell, 
who had been governor of South Carolina when the Revolution broke out, 
Bull had requested Lord George Germain, His Majesty's principal secretary 
of state for America, to recommend to the King that he be appointed gov-
ernor of South Carolina.7 Undoubtedly, Bull was aware that the position 
of intendant general of police, constituting as it did the highest civil office 
in Charles Town during the British occupation, might well be only a tem-
porary position that could lead to the governorship once civil government 
was re-established. Typical of the best of eighteenth-century administrators, 
Bull's motivation in accepting the office of intendant general seems to have 
been characterized by a fine balance between considerations of self interest 
and concern for the public good. 
Another aspirant to the governorship, Sir Egerton Leigh, also served 
on the Board of Police. Before the Revolution, Leigh had been a conspicu-
ous member of the royal administration. He had held, at one time or 
another, public office as a judge of the vice-admiralty court, as surveyor 
general of the lands, as attorney general, and as a member of the royal 
Council. 8 Leigh wrote to Lord Hillsborough stating that although he wished 
to decline a position on the Board of Police "on many accounts," he had 
decided to accept "losing sight of all personal regard to myself." However, 
he apparently recovered sight of "self," for in this same letter, he com-
plained that the small allowance of twenty shillings per day was not ade-
quate compensation for his services as an intendant of police. He pointed 
out the loss to his private law practice that attendance at the Board would 
entail and asked for a greater compensation than the "common allowances" 
• Ibid. 
7 William Bull to Lord George Germain, August 6, 1779, BPRO, XXXVI, 98-99. 
• Smith, op. cit., pp. 413-414. David Duncan Wallace, The History of South Caro-
lina, New York, 1934, II, 97. 
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awarded to the other members of the Board, "as it is acknowledged that 
the whole conduct of the Business must rest upon me as a Lawyer." Leigh 
also requested the salary of the office of attorney general, lest he be forced 
to "call in my own private monies for Subsistance, which I trust Your Lord-
ship will think a manifest and trying hardship."9 
In spite of the high premium that he attached to his own services as an 
intendant of the Board of Police, Leigh expressed "apprehensions that 
there must necessarily be a Feebleness in the Constitution of a new created 
Court which will find itself unequal to great and general purposes." How-
ever, Leigh did not wish to imply that his scepticism as to the effectiveness 
of the Board reflected in any way on the judgment of those who had set it 
up and hastened to add that he had no desire "to attack any system adopted 
by the King's Servants for the Common good."10 Unlike Bull, in the balance 
between self interest and the interest of the state, the weight of evidence 
seems to lie on the side of selfish motivation. 
Somewhat belatedly in October 1781, Thomas Knox Gordon, the former 
chief justice of South Carolina, presented his commission as an intendant 
of police.11 By his own admission, Gordon had accepted the position in 
South Carolina in the hope that it might eventually lead to his appointment 
to a judgeship on the Irish bench. Such were the intricacies of British 
patronage in the eighteenth century that the road to the office of puisne 
judge in Ireland might pass through the chief justiceship of South Carolina. 
After his banishment from the state in 1777, Gordon resided in Belfast, 
Ireland, and showed little inclination to return to South Carolina. There 
he concentrated on trying to gain an appointment to the Irish bench and 
"removing those prejudices in favour of America," which he sorrowfully 
found to be so prevalent among the people of Belfast.12 Perhaps his even-
tual return to South Carolina might be explained by an order of the British 
government in 1780 requiring all civil officers of the pre-revolutionary gov-
ernment in South Carolina to return to that province at the expense of the 
Crown. If they elected to remain in England, they might expect to lose the 
allowance that Parliament had provided for them since their expulsion from 
0 Sir Egerton Leigh to Lord Hillsborough, February 25, 1781, BPRO, XXXVI, llO-
lll. As Professor Rogers has pointed out in his Evolution of a Federalist, the greed of 
the Leighs was proverbial and probably did much to drive many other aspirants to 
public office in South Carolina into opposition to the royal government. George C. 
Rogers, Jr., Evolution of a Federalist, Columbia, 1962, p. 37. 
10 Sir Egerton Leigh to Lord Hillsborough, February 25, 1781, BPRO, XXXVI, ll2-
ll3. Leigh attended 51 sessions of the Board from February 1781 to August 1781. 
RBP, nos. 520-522. 
11 RBP, no. 523, October 26, 1781. 
12 Thomas Knox Gordon to Lord George Germain, November 20, 1777, BPRO, 
XXXVI, 84-87. 
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America by the revolutionaries.13 On the other hand, it may be that Gor-
don, having failed once again to obtain his coveted judgeship in Ireland, 
reconciled himself to the chief justiceship in South Carolina and agreed to 
serve temporarily on the Board of Police until the re-establishment of the 
civil courts in the province. 14 
In addition to Bull, Leigh, and Gordon, other members of the pre-
revolutionary royal government served as intendants on the Board of Police. 
These included two former members of the royal Council-Assistant Justice 
Edward Savage, a former judge of the court of vice-admiralty, 15 and 
Thomas Irving, the former receiver general of the quit rents.16 Also in 
attendance at the Board was James Johnston, a former royal clerk, who was 
appointed attorney general before the end of the occupation.17 
Several military officers sat on the Board from time to time. Among these 
were Colonel Alexander Innes, a British officer of distinction and a former 
secretary to the last royal governor of South Carolina, 18 and the popular, 
13 William Knox to Lt. Gov. Bull, July 6, 1780, BPRO, XXXVI, 101. 
" Once on the Board, Gordon seems to have performed his duties faithfully, attend-
ing 48 times between October 1781 and May 1782. RBP, nos. 520, 523-525. 
1
• Smith, op. cit., pp. 139, 414. Wallace, op. cit., II, 97. Savage attended the Board 
46 times from October 1781 to October 1782. RBP, nos. 520, 523-526. 
1
• Smith, op. cit., p. 413. Wallace, op. cit., II, 97. Wallace spells the name Irvin. 
Irving attended the Board 48 times from November 1781 to October 1782. RBP, nos. 
520, 523-526. 
17 Robert W. Barnwell, Jr., "The Migration of Loyalists from South Carolina," The 
Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association (hereinafter cited as SCHA 
Proceedings), 1937, p. 34. In this article, Barnwell mentions a James Johnson, a royal 
clerk, who was banished from South Carolina in 1777 for refusing to take the oath of 
abjuration. In his "Loyalism in South Carolina, 1765-1785," Barnwell mentions a James 
Johnson, Esq., who served on a committee of twenty-five that was appointed in Charles 
Town in June 1782 to consider measures for protecting the property of loyalists. Barn-
well suggests that this committee was probably composed of the most prominent loyal-
ists in Charles Town. Robert W . Barnwell, Jr., "Loyalism in South Carolina, 1765-
1785," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1941, p. 241. In her article on 
"Loyalism in Charleston, 1761-1784," Ella Levett states that in the negotiations for the 
surrender of Charles Town, the loyalists were represented by Alexander Wright and 
James Johnson. Ella Pettit Levett, "Loyalism in Charleston, 1761-1784," SCHA Pro-
ceedings, 1936, p. 12. A James Johnston is listed among the memorialists in London who 
had claims on the government as a result of their losses in the Revolution. South Caro-
lina Historical and Genealogical Magazine (hereinafter cited as SCHGM), XIV (1913), 
41. In the Miscellaneous Records, South Carolina Archives, TT, pp. 135-136, a James 
Johnston is appointed as attorney general in place of Sir Egerton Leigh in April 1782. 
Without being able to prove it, I have assumed that in these cases, James Johnson and 
James Johnston are the same person. Johnston attended the Board for 23 sessions from 
January 1782 to October 1782. RBP, nos. 523-526. Savage and Johnston, like Bull, 
Leigh, and Gordon, had all been banished from the state in 1777 for refusing to take 
the oath of abjuration. They had all returned to the state at various times after the fall 
of Charles Town. Barnwell, "The Migration of the Loyalists," op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
1
• Wallace, op. cit., II, 121. Innes attended the Board 20 times from July 1780 to 
January 1781. RBP, nos. 519-521. 
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distinguished, and gallant Colonel John Harris Cruger of New York, then 
stationed in South Carolina.19 
The only two gentlemen to sit on the Board continuously throughout its 
entire history from June 1780 to October 1782 were Robert William Powell 
and Alexander Wright, each of whom attended over 150 sessions.20 Both 
were moderate loyalists21 and highly esteemed in the community. Alex-
ander Wright, a prominent Charlestonian who was the son of the royal 
governor of Georgia, Sir James Wright, had been banished in 1777 for 
refusing to take the oath of abjuration.22 Robert William Powell, the com-
manding officer of the Charles Town militia, was a prominent merchant, 
who had been banished from Charles Town in 1778 for refusing to take 
the state oath swearing allegiance to the state and promising to defend 
it against George III.23 Powell's practical knowledge of mercantile affairs 
must have been of immeasurable value to the Board since many of the 
cases that came before it involved commercial transactions either directly 
or indirectly. 
This impressive array of legal and administrative talent got down to 
work by establishing a systematic procedure to handle the prodigious num-
ber of cases that came before it in its function as a court. The first rules 
of procedure provided that any person "aggrieved by the nonperformance 
of any Bargain or Agreement" might register a complaint with the clerk 
of the Board, who would thereupon issue a summons requiring the accused 
party to answer to the charges at its next meeting. At that time, "any Mat-
ter of doubt or difficulty," would then be referred to a group of arbitrators 
composed of one or more persons to be named by each party to the case 
and another chosen by the arbitrators themselves. If the plaintiff in the 
case feared that the accused might abscond without rendering payment of 
his debt, a warrant signed by one of the intendants might be issued setting 
1
• Cruger attended the Board 12 times from January 1782 to May 1782. RBP, 
nos. 523-525. 
20 RBP, nos. 519-526. 
21 In her article on the Charleston loyalists, Ella Levett points out that Alexander 
Wright and Robert Powell tried to set up a loyalist petition for Colonel Isaac Hayne's 
pardon after his famous trial. Levett, "Loyalism in Charleston," op. cit., p. 10. William 
Bull likewise tried to intercede for Hayne. On the other hand, Sir Egerton Leigh was 
adamant that Hayne should not be pardoned. I suspect that the Hayne trial was a pretty 
clear test of the more moderate loyalists, represented by Bull, Powell, and Wright, and 
the more extreme loyalists, represented by Sir Egerton Leigh. For an account of the trial 
and the controversy that ensued see Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina 
in the Revolution 1780-1783, New York, 1902, pp. 382-412. 
•• Barnwell, "The Migration of the Loyalists," op. cit., pp. 34-35. Although banished 
in 1777, Wright curiously enough seems to have returned to Charles Town in 1778 
while the city was still in the hands of the republican government and then joined the 
British in 1779. Ibid. 
•• Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina, 1765-1785," op, cit., p. 302. 
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bail equivalent to the amount of the sum in question and the anticipated 
costs of prosecuting the case. The cost of litigations before the Board was 
to be the same as the normal court costs. 24 
In September 1780, the Board, having determined "that their mode of 
proceeding in determining disputes, had been attended with Inconven-
iences, from its being too summary," made some modifications in its proce-
dure. It was provided that the Board would meet the first Monday in each 
month and hold continuous sessions until it had heard all matters that had 
been presented to it according to the proper procedure. The decisions of 
the arbitrators in cases were to be returned to the clerk of the Board in 
ten days, and the intendants were to meet on the third Monday in each 
month to approve the awards of the referees. If either party were dissatis-
fied with the determination of the referees, he might register his objections 
with the clerk of the Board at least three days before the award was to be 
considered. After an award was confirmed, ten days were to be allowed 
before executing the judgment except in cases where there was reason 
to believe the defendant might flee from the jurisdiction of the Board. In 
case a party who had been served with a process failed to appear, the 
members of the Board were given the authority to appoint all the referees, 
and thus the defendant would have no say so in the matter. If the party 
against whom an execution had been made could not be found, the judg-
ment might be levied on his goods.2~ 
Originally the Board of Police, as it was set up under the instructions 
of Sir Henry Clinton, had jurisdiction only over contracts entered into since 
the fall of Charles Town.26 However, in April 1781, by special order of the 
commandant of Charles Town, Colonel Nisbet Balfour, the Board was 
given "cognizance of all actions & suits ... for the recovery of Debts" 
entered into prior to the capture of Charles Town.27 Sir Henry Clinton later 
expressed disapprobation of this extension of the Board's jurisdiction but 
added that he sincerely believed that those in authority in Charles Town 
were "actuated in this matter by the very best intentions."28 
The greater portion of the work of the Board was concerned with 
referring cases to referees and trying cases that had been appealed from 
the arbitrators to the Board. However, little remains in its records of the 
nature of these cases, other than that the vast majority of these disputes 
dealt with questions concerning the obligations of contracts. 
•• RBP, no. 519, June 23, 1780. 
•• Ibid., September 11, 1780 . 
. •• Ibid., June 23, 1780. 
•• RBP, no. 521, April 2, 1781. 
•• Clinton, op. cit., p. 183. 
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In order to establish an equitable basis for determination of the just 
awards in disputed contracts, the Board of Police was forced to face the 
problem of the depreciation of the paper currency in the province since 
the outbreak of the Revolution. This depreciation was due initially to the 
enormous influx of paper currency issued by the presses of a Continental 
Congress that was desperately trying to finance the Revolution by printing 
paper money. In keeping with Gresham's law, this currency had driven 
gold and silver from the financial exchanges, thereby causing the enormous 
depreciation in the existing currency. 
The Board of Police appointed a committee of twelve to report the rela-
tive value of paper currency to gold and silver, as it could be determined 
at monthly intervals from January 1777 to June 1780. The committee made 
its report in December 1780 and presented at that time a sworn statement 
that included a table showing that the value of paper currency had fallen 
at a continually progressive rate from 1777 to 1780. According to the report 
of the committee, the ratio of gold and silver to paper currency had stood 
at a fairly steady ratio of around seven to one until 1777 when the first influx 
of continental bills was felt in the state. Since that time, the value of paper 
currency had fallen at a rate of depreciation ranging from 135% in January 
1777, 288% in January 1778, 798% in January 1779, 3,378% in January 1780 
to 8,115% in May 1780.29 This astronomical depreciation of the currency 
made it imperative that in the determination of cases involving the obliga-
tion of contracts, consideration should be given to the true value of the 
currency at the time the transaction was entered into. 
In its role as a civil administrative board, the Board of Police attempted 
to provide some regulatory measures for the vigorous trade that was carried 
on in Charles Town during the occupation. Commercial activity was enor-
mously complicated by the necessity of providing for the occupying forces 
and by the attempt on the part of patriot sympathizers and profiteers to 
smuggle goods to the revolutionaries. The picture was confused even more 
by the withdrawal of the patriot merchants and the return of British 
merchants. 
The Board sought to extend some control over the public markets of 
Charles Town by requiring all auctioneers and vendue masters to purchase 
licenses and to post bonds pledging themselves to carry out all the official 
regulations concerning trade. 30 In January 1781, the Board called upon the 
commissioners of markets to present their explanation as to the causes of 
•• RBP, no. 513. Percentages are given to the nearest whole number. The committee 
arrived at its figures by taking an average of the prices of specie and the country pro-
duce at given periods of time. 
•• RBP, no. 520, September 22, 1780. 
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the alarming rise in the prices of commodities. The commissioners believed 
that the rise in prices was to be attributed to sundry causes but especially 
to the forestalling of goods by British soldiers. The officials of the markets 
complained that the troops forestalled goods that were being brought to 
market and then sold them to the inhabitants at exorbitant prices. The 
Board recommended to the commandant that he establish rules and regu-
lations dealing with forestalling, operative on all alike, civilians as well as 
military personnel.31 Some months later, the Board questioned officials of 
the markets as to their diligence and effectiveness in the attempt to prevent 
forestalling and other abuses in the markets. The Board appeared to be 
satisfied with the efforts of the commissioners and assistants and enjoined 
them to "a steady perseverance therein."a2 
In the spring of 1782, the Board took into consideration the "irregular 
method of disposing of Fish" and ordered the commissioners of markets 
to formulate some regulations for the marketing of fish in order to supply 
the needs of the city more effectively. 33 The commissioners of the markets 
were instructed to put into force a former act of the Assembly entitled 
"An Act for a Fish Market." In an effort to stimulate the fish industry, a 
table of bounties was set up to reward those fishermen bringing the largest 
loads of fish to market. These bounties were to be paid from the funds of 
the Board of Police. 34 
The Board of Police acted as a regulatory agency, not only in the at-
tempt to regulate trade, but also in the effort to control the alarming rise 
in the price of bread. In July 1780, an order was issued fixing the weight 
of bread per shilling loaf and per six-penny loaf. It was provided that any 
bread sold under weights established by the Board was subject to confis-
cation and forfeiture to the poor of the parish. A baker guilty of offering 
loaves of bread for sale under the specified weights was subject not only 
to confiscation of his product but also to fine or "such Punishment as the 
enormity of his offense may deserve."35 
By the fall of the next year, the price of flour, as well as other pro-
visions, had risen at such an astronomical rate that the Board was prompted 
to take further action. Commissioners were appointed to purchase all the 
flour that was for sale within the garrison from importers and retail mer-
chants. This flour was then to be offered to the inhabitants of the city at 
•
1 Ibid., January 5, 1781. 
•• Ibid., November 24, 1781. 
•• RBP, no. 525, March 21, 1782. 
•• Ibid., April 1, 1782. Also the Board provided expenses for buoys and other neces-
sary expenses of the commissioners of pilotage in order to help keep the harbor navi-
gable. RBP, no. 520, January 5, 1781, May l, 1781. 
•• RBP, no. 519, July 11, 1780. 
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cost, plus whatever incidental expenses were involved. This was done in 
the belief that nothing could be done about the price of bread until the 
price of flour was first fixed. 36 In March 1782, the Board admitted that their 
attempt to stabilize the price of flour had not brought about a correspond-
ing decrease in the price of bread. It was reported that some bakers were 
making profits of eighty-three per cent. A further attempt to stabilize the 
price of bread was made by setting up a definite price scale by means of 
which the price of bread would be made to fluctuate according to the price 
of flour. Every fortnight the Board would ascertain the price of flour and 
then regulate the price of bread accordingly. These prices were to be pub-
lished in the local newspapers, and all retailers of bread were required to 
sell their products at the specified rates. Bakers were required to stamp 
their initials on each loaf, and fines and forfeitures were to be levied on 
anyone selling bread at prices other than those established by the Board.37 
Apparently there was some difficulty in getting the bakers to comply with 
this attempt at price regulation, for it was later suggested to the com-
mandant by the Board that all persons violating the ordinance be ordered 
out of the city.38 As a last resort, in order to prevent the sale of bread at 
illegal prices, the shops of bakers were to be inspected.39 
A number of memorials and petitions were submitted to the Board of 
Police involving property that had been captured by the British. Since some 
memorials and petitions concerning goods and merchandise that had been 
captured by the army had already been transmitted by Sir Henry Clinton 
for the consideration of the Privy Council in England, the Board considered 
all such matters to be outside the pale of its authority. However, the Board 
did review the memorial of Daniel Hall and Company stating that 120 
barrels of rice in the possession of that firm at the time of the capitulation 
had been impounded by the British commissary and that no compensation 
had been rendered for the rice.40 Since the articles of capitulation had 
provided that all public property belonged to the victor, 41 the crucial ques-
tion was whether or not the rice was to be considered public or private 
property. After considering the records of the "general Return of the Pro-
visions" in Charles Town at the time of the surrender, the intendants ad-
vised the commandant that the rice in question was public property and 
•• RBP, no. 520, November 24, 1781. 
87 RBP, no. 525, March 21, 1782. 
•• Ibid., March 27, 1782. 
•• Ibid., April 5, 1782. 
'
0 RBP, no. 520, July 14, 1780. 
"See articles of capitulation in Charleston Year Book 1897, Charleston, 1897, pp. 
388-389. 
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therefore was subject to confiscation without compensation.42 On the other 
hand, in the case of a large quantity of mahogany that had been seized 
by order of the commanding officer of engineers, the Board decided that 
the mahogany was clearly private property and could not be taken from 
the complainants without their consent and proper compensation.43 
Memorials and petitions were presented to the Board by persons whose 
houses and other property had been taken over by the British for the use 
of the occupying forces. These petitioners either wanted their property 
restored, or else they sought to receive compensation for the time it was 
in the possession of the British authorities. In one such case the Board 
recommended that "reasonable rent" be paid to Martha Savage, the widow 
of the loyalist William Savage, for several houses and buildings that had 
been requisitioned for use of the army. Likewise a fair compensation was 
to be rendered to John Scott, a loyalist, whose stores in Gadsden Alley were 
being used by the commissary general.44 The loyalist William Valentine, 
who had been one of those who had signed the congratulatory address to 
Clinton and Arbuthnot when Charles Town fell, 45 did not fare so well with 
the Board. When Valentine requested the return of his house on King 
Street, then in the possession of troops, the Board recommended that the 
"Barrack Master" allow him two rooms in his own house or "provide him 
with Commodious Quarters elsewhere."46 
As one might suspect, there is strong evidence that the patriots suffered 
more from the requisitioning of property in the city than did the loyalists. 
Although the loyalists were promised that their property would be returned 
as soon as circumstances permitted, no such assurance was given to the 
patriots. When the rebel Jonathan Sarrazin wrote the Board requesting 
possession of his house on the Bay, then occupied by the commissary of 
captures, he was coldly informed by the Board that "if Houses are wanted 
for public service-Mr. Sarrazin's is as proper to be appropriated thereto as 
any in Town." When Mrs. William Gibbes, wife of the prominent South 
Carolina revolutionary, asked to be compensated for her house that had 
been taken into possession by the British, she was somewhat sarcastically 
"RBP, no. 520, July 18, 1780. 
•• RBP, no. 519, September 19, 1780, October 13, 1780 . 
.. Ibid., September 19, 1780. A John Scott appears in the list of loyalists whose 
property was confiscated by the Jacksonborough Assembly. See Charleston Royal Ga-
zette, March 20, 1782. 
•• "Addressers of Clinton and Arbuthnot," photostat in South Caroliniana Library; 
also in SCHA Proceedings, 1939, p. 44. 
•• RBP, no. 519, September 19, 1780. 
36 THE SouTII CAROLINA HISTORICAL AssoCIATION 
reminded that although she might be inconvenienced by being deprived 
of her house, her husband after all was then residing with the enemy.47 
In compliance with Lord Cornwallis' order of September 1780, the 
Board also kept records of all the demands that were registered against the 
estates of patriots that had been sequestered by the British.48 In January 
1781, it was provided that any person who had any demands against the 
sequestered estates, now in the hands of John Cruden, commissioner of 
sequestered estates, was to file a claim with the secretary of the Board on 
or before the first of March 1781. Any claims made by persons that were 
residing in the province after that date were to be considered fraudulent. 
The secretary of the Board was ordered to keep an exact register of the 
demands brought in, and copious evidence remains in the records of the 
Board that the secretary performed his duties with care.49 
Only shortly after the Board began to hold sessions, it was brought to 
its attention that no persons were performing the duties of commissioners 
of the markets and streets and that consequently the streets had become 
"extremely dirty and would prove a Nuisance."50 In July 1780, the Board 
decided to appoint new commissioners and to put into effect the Sanitary 
Act of 1764.51 The commissioners thus appointed seemed to have been 
uncertain of their exact function and petitioned the Board to clarify their 
duties and to inform them how they were "to answer the weekly demands 
of Owners of Carts and Waggons, and Labourers and other necessary 
Persons to be employed by them." As to their duties, the intendants referred 
the commissioners to the Sanitary Act and requested them to present an 
estimate of the monthly expenses that would be required to put the said 
act into execution. 52 After the commissioners had presented their estimate 
of the costs to the Board, they were informed by the commandant that 
the town major would see that they received the necessary carts, horses, and 
other equipment needed for the upkeep of the streets. The commissioners 
'
7 RBP, no. 520, August 11, 1780. McCrady states that Jonathan Sarrazin was one 
of those later confined by the commandant in the provost. McCrady, op. cit., p. 369. 
The accusation that William Hazell Gibbes was then residing with the enemy is some-
what curious, for later in the month of August, he was one of those patriots rounded 
up and exiled to St. Augustine. "Josiah Smith's Diary, 1780-81," ed. Mabel L. Webber, 
SCH GM, XXIII ( 1932 ), 2-3. 
•• For a discussion of the sequestered estates see Wallace, op. cit., II, 228. For a 
fuller treatment see John Cruden, Report of the Management of the Estates Sequestered 
in South Carolina, by Order of Lord Cornwallis, in 1780-1782, ed. Paul Leicester Ford, 
Brooklyn, 1890. 
•• RBP, no. 520, January 5, 1781; no. 535, 1781. 
•• RBP, no. 519, June 23, 1780. 
"'Ibid., July 7, 1780. 
"' Ibid., July 28, 1780. 
.\ 
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were empowered to impress Negro slaves into service,53 and the revenue 
from two former acts of the Assembly was designated for their use.54 In 
spite of this effort to provide for the maintenance of the streets, in both 1781 
and 1782 the Board complained to the commissioners about the deplorable 
condition of the streets of Charles Town. These officials blamed their ap-
parent failure on the conduct of the soldiers in littering the streets. They 
also complained that sufficient equipment to carry out their tasks had not 
been allotted to them. 55 
Of even more immediate urgency than the upkeep of the streets was 
the necessity of maintaining fire protection for the city of Charles Town. 
To meet this need, the Board of Police appointed ten fire masters and nine 
managers of engines in addition to some other assistants.56 They were to 
perform those functions for the prevention and control of fires as provided 
for in an act of the Assembly passed in 1756.57 From time to time, con-
siderable sums of money were granted by the Board for the employment 
of workers and the cost of the repair of the fire engines, wells, and pumps.58 
Alarmed by the number of fires that started in chimneys, the Board recom-
mended twenty shillings "over and above the usual Penalties and Charges" 
to be levied on any person whose chimney might catch fire in the future. 
A fine of an equal amount was imposed on all persons who failed to have 
chimneys that were in use swept at least once in every fifteen days.59 
If there was too much light from fires, there was too little from the 
"public Lamps." The Board, aware of "many Inconveniences" that resulted 
from the streets being inefficiently lighted, ordered the former street lighter 
to appear before them to discuss the cost of meeting this deficiency. The 
intendants of police were informed by the street lighter that there was not 
at that time in the city any oil but "sweet oil," a factor that evidently made 
the operation much more expensive. He reported that he had negotiated 
with the military authorities to light fifteen lamps for a fee of three dollars 
per night. At this rate, the Board decided the cost of attempting to provide 
sufficient lighting for the streets would be prohibitive, and presumably in 
the last days of British rule the streets remained in a darkened state.60 
•• RBP, no. 520, August 8, 1780. 
•• Ibid., September 8, 1780. These two acts were "An Act for Raising a Public Store 
of Gun Powder in this Province," Statutes at Large of South Carolina ( hereinafter cited 
as S.C. Statutes), ed. Thomas Cooper, Columbia, 1838-1841, 11]], 580-590; and "An Act 
for Taxing Transient Persons," ibid., IV, 74. 
•• RBP, no. 520, January 5, 1781; no. 525, April 18, 1782, May 14, 1782. 
•• RBP, no. 519, July 11, 1780. 
•
1 Ibid., July 7, 1780. S.C. Statutes, IV, 27. 
•• RBP, no. 520, October 20, 1780, January 5, 1781, May 4, 1781, July 6, 1781. 
•• Ibid., August 11, 1780. 
•• RBP, no. 525, March 19, 1782. 
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One of the most persistent problems of the Board of Police concerned 
the care of the poor. The poor are always with us, and the church wardens 
of St. Philip's never let the intendants of police forget this. At the very first 
meeting of the Board, a memorial of the poor of Charles Town was referred 
to the Board by the commandant. This memorial was presented by some 
eighty persons, who had heretofore been maintained by a fund raised by 
an "assessment on the inhabitants of the Town" and administered by 
St. Philip's Parish. After the capitulation of Charles Town, the responsi-
bility for the maintenance of these people was somewhat of an open ques-
tion due to the absence of civil government and the general disorder in the 
city. The Board recommended that the commandant make available to 
St. Philip's church wardens, "men of Property and Integrity," some pro-
visions of pork or beef, rice, peas, butter, and vinegar to be distributed 
among these needy people. It was suggested that these provisions should 
be sufficient to last a fortnight, at the expiration of which time it was hoped 
"some other Mode, less expensive to Government," might be found. 61 
No specific or systematic method for providing for the needs of the 
poor seems to have been worked out, although the Board did, from time to 
time, in face of repeated petitions from the church wardens, appropriate 
money from various sources such as the money derived from the sale of 
tavern licenses.62 Still in need of funds, the church wardens suggested 
eliciting a subscription among the parishioners for the care of the poor, and 
the Board thereupon urged them to do so.63 Throughout 1781 and 1782, 
in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, the Board awarded sums for the indigent; 
and in May 1782, the Board, with the approval of the commandant, appro-
priated money to provide housing for an overseer and nurse. Funds were 
made available for the repair of the Poor House and for its remodelling in 
order to provide a place for "Persons disordered in their senses."64 
The Board was concerned not only with the care of the poor but also 
with that other dependent element in eighteenth-century Charles Town 
society, the Negro. Considerable embarrassment was caused the British 
forces by those slaves who had deserted their masters and had attempted 
to join the British army, presumably in the hope of thereby attaining their 
freedom. Lord Cornwallis hoped that some way could be worked out to 
persuade the Negroes to return to their masters and, at the same time, to 
persuade the masters not to punish those slaves who had defected to the 
•
1 RBP, no. 519, June 23, 1780. 
•• RBP, no. 520, October 24, 1780, February 2, 1781; no. 521, March 27, 1781, 
May 1, 1781. 
•• RBP, no. 520, October 27, 1780. 
•• RBP, no. 525, May 18, 1782. 
THE CHARLES TOWN BOARD OF POLICE, 1780-1782 39 
British. At the Board's suggestion, three men were appointed to supervise 
the return of these runaway slaves to their rightful owners. These three 
gentlemen were to purchase rice to feed their charges and to keep them 
employed, preferably on some public project, until such time as they could 
be returned to their masters.65 This effort to return the defected slaves 
must have been carried through with some success; for, in September 1780, 
the commandant informed the intendants of police that a hundred able-
bodied Negroes were needed for a fortnight "to repair some of the works 
and Lines about the Town." The Board advised the commandant to impress 
the required slaves from certain stipulated plantations.66 In November 1780, 
the Board, in response to an application from Major Moncrief, the chief 
engineer, again had to resort to the impressment of three hundred Negroes 
to "repair Fortifications and for other Works in Charles Town."67 
Control of the conduct of the Negroes was also a problem. With this 
in mind, the intendants of police recommended that the commandant 
employ troops to deal with the insurrectional behavior of the slaves on the 
plantations.68 The unruly conduct of Negroes and other "disorderly Per-
sons" in the punch houses and dram shops in the city prompted the Board 
to pass stricter regulations concerning licenses for "houses of public enter-
tainment" and for the sale of liquor.69 
Also in respect to the Negro, the Board of Police endeavored to enforce 
the proclamation of the commandant designed to prevent the illegal ex-
portation of Negroes. This proclamation required a ship captain to post a 
bond promising to comply with the regulations concerning the exportation 
of Negroes set up under the applicable acts of the Assembly of the 
province. 70 
Problems of the dead, as well as those of the living, came to the attention 
of the Board. In August 1780, Simpson informed the other members of the 
Board that some people "have broken up the Ground in the Church Yards 
in Charles Town, and have committed other Irregularities in the same, 
without proper or legal Licence or Authority for so doing." The church 
•• RBP, no. 520, June 13, 1780. 
•• Ibid., September 8, 1780. 
•
1 Ibid., November 7, 1780. 
•• RBP, no. 519, July 14, 1780. 
•• RBP, no. 520, September 29, 1780. 
10 RBP, no. 519, August 29, 1780. The two acts referred to here were "An Act for 
the Entry of Vessels" and "An Additional and Explanatory Act to an Act for the Entry 
of Vessels," S.C. Statutes, II, 140-142; III, 526. A fine of one hundred pounds current 
money was levied against a party in August 1780; and in March 1781, Captain Nowland 
of the ship Polly bound to Jamaica was fined one hundred pounds sterling for attempt-
ing to smuggle out six Negroes. RBP, no. 519, August 29, 1780; no. 521, March 13, 
1781. 
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wardens were thereupon summoned and charged to prevent such devious 
conduct in the future. The church officials took this occasion to point out 
that the burying ground set aside for "strangers" was filled, and the Board 
therefore ordered the wardens to find a suitable place for the burial of 
strangers and transient persons. 71 The church wardens performed their task 
promptly, and shortly after, a notice was entered in the Gazette designating 
a new burial ground for transient persons. The responsibility for providing 
a suitable burial place for Negroes was considered to be the duty of the 
public authorities rather than the church. When it was brought to the atten-
tion of the intendants that the graveyard set aside for Negroes was filled, 
the Board recommended that its secretary write to the commissioners of 
streets "requiring them to look out for and set apart some proper place 
as a burying ground for Negroes.72 
The news of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, which reached Charles 
Town in November 1781, and the consequent uncertainty of the fate of 
the British in the southern city must have seriously impeded the work and 
effectiveness of the Board. In December 1781, the Board complained of 
the difficulty of securing referees for the determination of cases and re-
quested the commandant to issue an order compelling citizens to serve as 
referees when requested upon pain of a fine or imprisonment.73 However, 
on January 30, 1782, an order from the commandant virtually acknowledged 
the ineffectiveness of the Board and thereby ordered that no suits should 
be considered thereafter except those of "pressing and immediate necessity." 
Other actions were to be delayed until they could be more "fully and delib-
erately discussed" after the full establishment of civil government. In com-
pliance with the commandant's order, the Board immediately adopted regu-
lations requiring all persons wishing to bring cases before the Board to 
show cause why the case was one of immediate necessity and should thus 
be entered into at this time.74 In the light of this changed state of affairs, 
the Board next proceeded to effect a rather drastic change in its procedure. 
Since it was now anticipated that the number of cases brought before it 
would be greatly diminished, it was proposed that sessions of the Board be 
held only once every three months. In order to circumvent the difficulty of 
71 RBP, no. 519, August 11, 1780; no. 520, August 11, 1780. 
72 RBP, no. 520, July 18, 1780. 
73 RBP, no. 523, December 15, 1781. 
" Ibid., January 30 1782. "Ordered that in future the Suitors at this Board do set 
forth in the Petition which commences the Suit, not only the Cause of Action between 
the Parties, but the reasons upon Oath for, Commencement of it at this time, such as 
the Defendant being about to remove himself or his property out of the reach of Process, 
any fraud either already practiced or intended, the Necessity of the Suitor and the 
AfHuence of the Debtor, or any other Circumstance that may induce the Board imme-
diately to entertain it. . . ." 
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obtaining arbitrators, cases were to be tried before a jury of twelve that 
was to have jurisdiction over all cases concerning freehold and any other 
matter in which the sum involved was more than ten pounds sterling. 
Jurymen were to be selected by a somewhat elaborate method from the 
freeholders, whose names were to be drawn from the poor tax list.75 A fine 
of five pounds was imposed for nonattendance on the jury.76 This procedure 
was little used, however, for by June 1782, it was generally known that the 
British were to withdraw from Charles Town.77 
Less than two months before the final withdrawal of the British forces 
in December 1782, the Board of Police was requested by Lieutenant Gen-
eral Alexander Leslie to terminate its proceedings by the 31st of October. 
The Board immediately made preparations to close its final business, and 
the intendant general was instructed by the other members to "acquaint 
General Leslie that they have taken the proper steps for putting a Period 
to the Proceedings of the Board."78 For all intent and purposes, the admin-
istration of royal government in South Caroilna was at an end. 
As the Advent season approached in 1782, loyalists, of both great and 
little faith, sadly prepared for the departing of the King's forces. The city 
was a mass of congestion and confusion as the troops as well as many 
loyalists made their preparations to depart. The harbor was filled with 
ships preparing to set sail for England as the continental troops and officials 
of the republican government waited impatiently to enter the city. The 
bells of St. Michael's were not there to ring in the new order for the British 
had pillaged them away, and the empty belfry was a telling symbol that 
altar and Crown had forever been severed in Charles Town. 
Among those leaving the city were the intendants of police who accepted 
a self-imposed exile from South Carolina and eventually died abroad. Their 
hopes for the honors of office under a re-established royal government had 
been shattered by forces and events outside of their control. As for the 
work of the intendants on the Board of Police, that too assumed an element 
of futility; for the re-established courts of the state declared the Board to 
1
• Ibid. "It is ordered that the Sheriffs do forthwith take from the present Poor's Tax 
list, the names of all such Inhabitants of Charles Town as are rated at the sum of five 
Shillings sterling Tax; or above, and put the same in a Box to be kept in their Custody 
under the Locks, each of them keeping one key, and the Clerk of the Board another; 
that thirty names be drawn thereout, in the presence of the Board, by a Child under 
nine years of Age, and the Persons so drawn summoned by the Sheriffs as soon as pos-
sible to attend on the second Tuesday in February next, when twelve shall be drawn 
out of such as appear, by a Child of the same Age to serve as Jurymen for that Court, 
subject to the usual,,Challenges, and the deficiencies to be made by Talies drawn in the 
usual manner. . . . 
1
• Ibid. 
77 Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina, 1765-1785," op. cit., p. 240. 
78 RBP, no. 526, October 28, 1782. 
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have been an illegal body, and hence its decisions were not binding in 
cases of law in South Carolina. However, the function of the Board as an 
organ of civil administration was to prove long lasting, for the Board had, 
at the very least, preserved an element of continuity in the civil adminis-
tration of the city during an extremely difficult period under military oc-
cupation. 
RACISM IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF 
GOVERNOR COLE BLEASE 
RONALD D. BURNSIDE 
When Benjamin Ryan Tillman led the movement which overthrew the 
aristocracy in 1890, South Carolina entered upon the road to democracy. 
Tillman drew on the agrarian discontent to gain support, but his movement 
affected little lasting reform and discontent lingered. 
Coleman Livingston Blease, adept at the art of demagoguery, capitalized 
on this discontent. As spokesman for the cotton-mill workers and the com-
mon man in general, Blease built a political following that made him a 
factor in state politics for fifty years. From the time of his election to the 
state assembly in 1890 as a member of the Tillman Reform Party until his 
departure from politics in 1938, he continually ran for office. He gained 
high office on three occasions: in 1910 and 1912 he was elected governor, 
and in 1924 United States senator. 
Blease's political success was due in large part to his constant play on 
certain emotional themes. The fervent espousal of views popular among 
the less fortunate classes served to strengthen his identification with this 
group that was vital to his success. The most prominent of these themes 
was racism, and in his violent attacks on the Negro, Blease surpassed the 
reactionary rantings of Ben Tillman. 
In the immediate post-Civil War period, the strong anti-Negro attitude 
of the later years had not yet crystallized. Whether some of the views of 
the Hampton era concerning the Negro were based solely on political 
expediency or whether they had a more humanitarian basis, there was 
concern voiced for the Negro's condition. "We must obliterate the color 
line in politics," urged one Hampton supporter, "and invite the colored man 
into our ranks the same as we invite the white man, and accord him every 
right we accord the white man."1 
After the 1880's South Carolina politicians no longer expressed the con-
ciliatory racial views of the Hampton years. Intense hatred of the Negro 
came with the rise of Tillmanism and the spread of white democracy. This 
hatred created an emotional issue that soon became part of the stump 
repertory of most political candidates. Tillman became a leading proponent 
of Negro-baiting and his lengthy and crude expositions received wide en-
dorsement.2 When he left state politics, the Negro-mania subsided and the 
spectre of Negroism was aired less frequently. But Blease revived the 
1 From speech by General Johnson Hagood at Spartanburg on August 15, 1878, as 
quoted in Hampton M. Jarrell, Wade Hampton and the Negro, Columbia, 1950, p. 131. 
• For a discussion of Tillman's racial views, see Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben 
Tillman, Baton Rouge, 1944, pp. 393-407. 
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extreme racist views and paraded them flamboyantly before campaign 
crowds, legislative assemblies, and the nation. 
Blease' s racial views were predicated on the basic premise of the innate 
inferiority of the Negro race. Unlike the psalmist who in humility sang of 
the inscrutable ways of God, Blease, with facility and confidence, plumbed 
the depths of divine wisdom and discerned the pattern hidden to less 
perceptive eyes. In the time-honored tradition of those who glibly quote 
scripture and verse while completely ignoring the spirit of the Bible, he 
bolstered the case for white supremacy: "I am convinced, after the most 
careful thought and study, that the Almighty created the negro to be hewers 
of wood and drawers of water. When it comes to placing him in any of 
the professions, we are endeavoring to do something with him which God 
never intended."3 Invoking the lessons of the past, he noted: "In all Bible 
history and in all profane history, you will find that the superior race has 
ruled and controlled: and the white people of this country are going to 
rule it, and control it if it be necessary to wipe the black race off the face 
of the earth."4 
Blease cited as further proof of the Negro's inferiority his low moral 
nature which forbade him forever from associating with white people on 
a level even approaching equality. "The negro race has absolutely no stand-
ard of morality. They are, in that respect a class by themselves, as marital 
infidelity seems to be their more favorite pastime."5 Blease's view of Negro 
morality also led him to the "serious doubt as to whether the crime of rape 
can be committed upon a negro,''6 a factor of some influence in his granting 
of pardons. 
In spite of his attacks on the race, Blease quickly affirmed his affection 
for individual Negroes. He prided himself in his sense of fairness and stated 
that "when a negro does a day's work I believe in paying him for his day's 
work, and treating him kindly and justly."7 When asked for a donation by 
the Negroes of his home county to help finance their annual banquet, he 
accompanied his check with the comment: "I hope all the 'OLD DARKIES' 
will have a good time, and you must tell them the Governor wishes for 
them all-and I know nearly everyone of them personally-many years of 
happy life.''8 He further demonstrated his paternalistic spirit by handing 
• New York Times, November 28, 1910. 
• Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., p. 7701. 
• Spartanburg Herald, January 23, 1914. 
• Statement of Pardons, Paroles and Commutations in Reports and Resolutions of the 
General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 1914, III, 236. 
7 Elease to Sherman S. Furr, April 1, 1913, Elease Papers, South Carolina Archives 
( hereinafter SCA). 
• Elease to Reverend James G. Daniel, April 5, 1913, Elease Papers, SCA. 
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out five-dollar bills to old Negroes of his acquaintance, some of whom 
would greet him on the street with a worshipful, "Good Mohnin', sub. You 
is sho like de Laud Jesus Christ to us po' nigguhs, suh."9 This attitude, 
however, signified no departure from his views on the race as a whole: "I 
am no enemy to the negro . . . but I believe in keeping him in his place 
at all times and under all conditions."10 
Like Tillman, Blease showed concern over a future conflict between the 
races. He warned against this in the campaign of 1910 and again in his 
inaugural address. In messages and speeches he called on the assembly to 
abolish Negro secret lodges which, among other things, were paving the 
way for this coming struggle. He pictured the situation in ominous words: 
"But I tell you, you white people, you may sleep if you please, in your quiet 
beds; you may rest, if you please, quietly at home, and when you ask the 
watchman upon the watch tower, What of the Night? he may answer that 
all is quiet; but I tell you that it is not all quiet in South Carolina."11 To 
forestall this conflict he was against education of the Negro and warned 
against permitting anything that might tend toward social equality of the 
races. He pointed out the economic threat of Negro acquisition of land. 
If the practice continued, he foresaw the white race "facing a very serious 
situation in dealing with the negro landowners. What remedy should be 
applied is a matter which I cannot discuss too freely, for fear the timid-
hearted will say, 'He is stirring up strife and race prejudice.' But I call it 
to your attention and ask you to give it your very earnest consideration.''12 
On the subject of Negro disfranchisement, he denied any injustice by 
the whites. "I do know that the colored people of my State are not anxious 
to vote. I have never heard of them making any special clamor for the 
privilege of voting.'' He attributed this to the lack of "a decent party" sub-
scribing to their political beliefs. But, he argued, for those desiring to vote 
there were no constitutional bars: "We have a constitutional provision 
which does not keep any man from voting . . . it is a question as to 
whether or not they go and receive their voting certi:6.cate.''13 
• Osta L. Warr, "Mr. Blease of South Carolina," American Mercury, January 1929, 
p. 28. 
10 Blease to Sherman S. Furr, April 1, 1913, Blease Papers, SCA. 
11 Newberry Herald and News, August 15, 1911. Journal of the House of Repre-
sentatives of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 1912, pp. 15-16. 
12 House Journal, 1913, p. 47. 
1
• Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 1491. What Blease failed to point 
out was that this applied only to the general election. Party rules effectively disfran-
chised the Negro in the primary by requiring that he prove, by the endorsement of ten 
white men, that he had voted for Wade Hampton in 1876 and had voted the Demo-
cratic ticket continuously since that time. Rules of the Democratic Party of South Caro-
lina, 1914, sec. 7. 
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Elease endorsed the popular belief of Southern politicians that only the 
repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution could bring greater 
harmony between the races. As long as the Negro technically occupied a 
position for which he was not fitted, little progress could be made. 
In spite of his professed belief that the Negro did not desire an improve-
ment in status, 14 Governor Blease maintained a constant vigil to insure that 
the spectre of social equality remained dormant. He condemned the Negro 
lodges as focal points for dissemination of hated doctrines. He attacked 
every relationship between white and Negro that did not cast the Negro in 
a servile role. 
An example of this vigilance was the controversy with Benedict College, 
a Negro school in Columbia. In 1911 Blease showed concern over the pres-
ence of white persons on the faculty of the college. His first fears were 
aroused at the sight of a white woman, "no slouch, no piece of ignorance, 
no bundle of humanity couched in dirt, but a handsome, intelligent wom-
an,''15 walking across the campus at Benedict with her arms around a 
Negro boy and girl. This time he merely warned against the danger, but 
in 1914 he launched an active campaign. He sent to the assembly his 
charges against the institution and demanded action. "I have done my part. 
If you fail to do yours, you and you alone are responsible . . . it is a fact 
that you have a heart and a conscience, and by not helping to relieve these 
conditions the day may come when you will regret it." In shotgun fashion 
the Governor levied his charges: a white faculty member had played on 
the Negro football team; the boy's dormitory had a white matron; the boys 
in the dormitory had pictures of white women in their rooms; at a social 
gathering whites and Negroes ate at the same tables; in a faculty photo-
graph the positions in which white women were standing were immoral.16 
College officials attempted explanation but met with typical Elease 
disdain. The reply that the American Baptist Home Missionary Society, 
sponsor of a number of Negro schools in the South, had made the appoint-
ments out of a sense of conviction that "the principles of Christ's teachings 
"As United States senator, Blease expressed his opinion on this matter: "The ne-
groes of South Carolina do not want social equality. The best element of them will so 
express themselves at any time. What they do desire is equal rights and equal accom-
modations in traveling and so forth, but they have no desire to hold office, and they 
have no desire to associate with white people." Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st 
sess., p. 1999. 
1
• Newberry Herald and News, August 15, 1911. 
1
• The only indication of Governor Blease's definition of an immoral position came 
from the legislative debates in 1914 on the Fortner Bill to prevent white persons from 
teaching in Negro schools. C. D. Fortner, author of the bill, displayed the faculty photo-
graph during debate in the House, and warned: "Talk about it [Benedict College] not 
teaching social equality. Look at this picture of a white woman teacher with her arms 
around a negro teacher." Newberry Herald and News, January SO, 1914. 
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are good for the advancement and welfare of the negro as well as of the 
white man" brought only ridicule. Blease disclaimed knowledge of any 
such missionary group, denied that the Baptist denomination could in any 
way approve of such iniquitous practice, and denounced such implementa-
tion of Christian beliefs as "humiliating and nauseating." The society-
endorsed white president was shown no quarter: "Your negro-loving white 
president . . . is about as low as it is possible for any man with a white 
mother to get and is unworthy of the association of any decent gentleman." 
Blease claimed justification of all charges and summed up his views with 
unmistakable clarity. "Your College is a stench in the nostrils of all decent 
people." He characterized the faculty picture as part of a scheme to induce 
Negro boys to the college so they could associate with white women. "In 
my opinion, your College . . . is doing more to bring about social equality 
than anything else in South Carolina." But, he warned, if there is any 
attempt to carry out these teachings of "negro-loving trustees and presi-
dents . . . there is enough powder and lead left in South Carolina to wipe 
them off the face of the earth." He cited the recent execution of a Negro 
rapist as the result to which the school's dangerous teachings must lead: 
"No doubt he had passed your college on his way home, and seen your 
white women teachers' locking arms on social equality terms with negroes, 
and he decided that he must have him a white woman teacher." But Blease 
had a simple solution to this threat. "If the white people of Columbia . . . 
would do their duty, they would order those white teachers out there to 
leave the city and if they didn't leave within twenty-four hours they would 
have to suffer the consequences." Although no formal action resulted, the 
faculty photograph became a standard prop in Blease's stump performances 
in 1914 as he painted in vivid colors the dangers that it symbolized.17 
The race issue served as a very effective politicial weapon for Blease. 
When other arguments had been exhausted, or in some cases before they 
were even posed, the Negro question was hauled in to cloud the issue or 
to make suspect the reputation of a rival. An opponent became a "nigger-
lover" and an advocate of social equality. In his feud with Senator Niels 
Christensen, the senator's father was falsely characterized as the leader of 
a Negro military unit. On occasion Blease levied the more extreme charge 
that the antagonist had "nigger blood" in his veins; the editor of The State 
was often so described. Many an opponent became a member of the hated 
Haskell Convention of 1890, a group of anti-Tillmanites who appealed to 
the Negro in an attempt to prevent election of Pitchfork Ben. For many 
rabid supporters Blease's declamations became gospel truth, and the tainted 
adversary found it difficult to vindicate himself from the charge. 
11 Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 
1914, pp. 823-832. 
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Blease's racial views brought him into conflict with the national admin-
istration. He showed much concern about racial conditions in Washington, 
D. C., and through a correspondent in that city kept apprised of the sit-
uation.18 The National Democratic Fair Play Association of the United 
States, an organization dedicated to segregation in government service, also 
provided him with information. This information became the basis for 
condemnation of the Wilson administration, a frequent target of Blease 
criticism. In a speech delivered before an audience of lustily cheering mill 
workers, Blease denounced a system that forced white men, but particu-
larly white girls, to work in the same offices with, and sometimes even 
under the supervision of, Negro men. He predicted that Woodrow Wilson 
would not be re-elected if such a policy continued. In anticipation of the 
coming senatorial race of 1914, he solemnly promised to rectify this wrong 
when he got to Washington.19 This was one of the few matters on which 
Blease and The State agreed. The State applauded segregation of white 
and Negro clerks in the Treasury Department: "That whites and Negroes 
should work together at the same desks and eat together in restaurants in 
the governmental departments is neither necessary nor desirable."20 
The inaugural parade of President Wilson also posed problems. Blease 
refused to allow the South Carolina militia to participate, and threatened 
to veto any appropriation to send cadets from The Citadel. He stated his 
reasons frankly. He feared that William E. Gonzales, editor of The State 
and the leading Wilson man in South Carolina, would be in charge of the 
state's representation. "It will be his pleasure," Blease observed, "to place 
the Governor of South Carolina in any embarrassing position on that occa-
sion in which he could place me, by fair means or foul, or treachery, which 
is so well known to his race." The threat was the possible positioning of 
South Carolina's troops behind Negro militiamen representing other states. 
According to the order of march the District of Columbia militia, including 
a Negro battalion, would be in the lead position. "It will, therefore, clearly 
be seen that if the South Carolina troops should participate they would not 
only be given a position behind negro troops, but behind negro troops 
holding the position of honor in the parade."21 For his adamant stand Blease 
received many letters of congratulation from within and without the state. 22 
1
• Frank (?) to Blease, May 26, 1914, Blease Papers, SCA. 
1
• Anderson Daily Mail, December l, 1913. Wilson was not the only national figure 
so criticized by the Carolinian. When Herbert Hoover, as secretary of commerce, ordered 
an end to segregation in his department, Blease, then a senator, attacked Hoover bit-
terly; he referred to the future president as "a man who is in favor of making young 
white girls use the same waterclosets as Negro men." Warr, op. cit., p. 26. 
2° Columbia State, May 16, 1913. 
•
1 House Journal, 1913, pp. 164-165, 489-493. 
22 James P. Waldrop to Blease, January 19, 1913; M. G. Somer to Blease, February 
12, 1913; W. S. Schooley to Blease, February 14, 1913, Blease Papers, SCA. 
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Relations between Blease and the federal government on the status of 
the South Carolina militia were always strained, and here the Negro issue 
contributed to a lack of co-operation. In 1911 the war department suggested 
that the states enact legislation to establish cadet companies in the high 
schools. The adjutant general of South Carolina endorsed the program on 
condition that the federal government would furnish the arms, ammunition, 
and an officer in charge. Blease quickly quashed the plan in his reply to 
the assistant secretary of war: "My most serious objection to your bill is 
that I am unalterably opposed to arming negro school children. . .. I 
think he [the adjutant general] is mistaken when he thinks that a Republi-
can National Administration will allow him or anybody else to have an act 
passed in which they are to furnish funds and to restrict it simply to white 
people." If there were any discrimination it would be in favor of the Ne-
groes who, he was certain, would receive the larger portion of arms. "This 
everybody knows, who knows anything about the Republican Party . . . 
the negroes would then have these arms and ammunition in case of a riot 
or insurrection to the detriment of our white people."23 
The same fear of Negro insurrection contributed to a feud with the 
federal government over the mustering out of companies of the state militia. 
The governor protested vigorously when the secretary of war in 1913 
notified Blease that certain companies, because they failed to pass annual 
inspection, must be mustered out if the state continued to receive federal 
funds. Although Blease felt the companies should be given another chance 
to pass the inspection, his principal objection was stated in a letter to the 
secretary: "A close inspection will show that the companies ... are lo-
cated in the Black Belt of this State, where it is absolutely necessary that 
we should have armed white men, and if the United States Government 
withdraws her entire support South Carolina will keep these companies."24 
Among the Negro people Blease's antics evoked different sentiments. 
The governor boasted that he was such a good friend of the race that if 
an election were ever held in South Carolina in which only Negroes could 
vote, he would get from seventy-five to ninety per cent of the votes cast.25 
The accuracy of this boast is questionable, but of those who gave expression 
to their feelings many were favorable to Blease. Some Negroes, as well as 
whites, were attracted by the Blease showmanship, and the "few who attend 
meetings laugh fittin' to bus' when they hear themselves called 'baboons 
•• Undated, untitled clipping, Blease Papers, SCA. 
"House Journal, 1914, p. 105. In a lengtl1y message to the assembly, Blease for-
warded all correspondence on this matter. House Journal, 1914, pp. 81-165. 
•• Columbia State, December 14, 1912. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., 
p. 1490. 
50 THE SoUTII CAROLINA HxsTORICAL AssoCIATION 
and free niggers.' "26 One Negro found in the governor's policy a sense of 
security: "As a black man I wish to congratulate you for your frankness, 
honesty and definite stand on the negro. If other governors would do like-
wise and thereby permit the American people to know where they stand 
on the Negro question, to my mind, the bl,acks would be better off."27 Still 
others discounted the governor's violent attacks on their race as political 
expedients. "The negroes of South Carolina are well pleased with the ad-
ministration of Governor Blease," wrote one Negro correspondent, "as he 
is not sincere in all his statements.''28 In a long and laudatory introduction 
to a Blease speech at the opening exercises at Allen University, a Negro 
school in Columbia, a Negro Episcopal bishop dismissed the harsh things 
said by Blease on the stump as intended "only to tickle the ears of the 
voters and thereby gain their support.''29 In the election of 1912 the presi-
dent of Allen University urged the Negroes who could vote to cast their 
ballot for the governor.30 
In speeches to Negro groups Blease's tone was one of moderation, dis-
playing his ability to win any crowd by telling it what it wanted to hear. 
In his speech at Allen University, this same man who had viciously ma-
ligned the Negro before white audiences commended the race for its 
entrance into the professions and the varied phases of commercial life. 
While the auditorium rocked with cheers of approval, Blease shouted: 
"You are coming into higher things. They can't hold you back, despite what 
I or any other man may say."31 
But there were expressions of disapproval. Dr. Thomas Miller was 
removed by Blease from the presidency of the Negro college at Orangeburg 
on the grounds of political opposition. Dr. Miller replied in justification of 
his position that, "I felt that your announced policy against the Negro was 
not founded upon justice and the best interest of the state; for that reason 
I tried to bring about your defeat.''32 Blease's frequent tirades in defense 
of lynching also brought condemnation by Negroes who feared the encour-
agement of injustice to their race.33 And, in the eyes of some, the release 
of Negro prisoners was not the positive proof of friendship the governor 
pictured it as being. "The man of the race asks no pardon for another of 
•• Charleston News and Courier, July 16, 1912. 
•• Sherman S. Furr to Blease, undated, Blease Papers, SCA. 
•• Columbia State, June 27, 1912. 
•• Columbia State, October 5, 1916. 
•• Columbia State, June 27, 1912. 
11 Columbia State, October 5, 1916 . 
.. Columbia State, January 29, 1911. 
.. Columbia State, July 8, 1911. 
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his race charged with crime against society and the civilizing influence of 
Christianity when he is given fair trial and found guilty.''34 
The most applauded, as well as the most condemned, of Blease's expres-
sions on the race question was his outspoken advocacy of lynching. This 
means of swift punishment without benefit of trial had become widely prac-
ticed in the South in the years following Reconstruction. And by the waning 
years of the nineteenth century the practice had acquired its champions. 
One of the first, and without doubt the most vocal, was Ben Tillman. Dur-
ing his first administration he demanded the enforcement 0£ law and the 
prevention of lynching. Afterwards, however, he became an ardent de-
fender of the practice. In words unparalleled for their frankness, Tillman, 
as governor and senator, presented the South's case to the world. In vivid 
language he described the black brute lurking in the shadows, awaiting his 
opportunity to deflower Southern womanhood. For Tillman, torture and 
death were too kind for the beast who had placed himself beyond the pale 
of both human and divine law.35 
Governor Blease, emulating his illustrious predecessor, was equally vocal 
in his declarations on lynching. From the stump, in newspaper interviews, 
and through messages to the legislature he preached his doctrine of accel-
erated justice. "If any woman of his family was insulted by a Negro," he 
declared, "all he would ask was that the negro be caught; he would do the 
rest himself .''36 Also he would take no official action to prevent others from 
carrying out their duties as southern men. "I will never order out a militia 
company, so help me God," he vowed, "and tell my home boys and girls ... 
to shoot down a white boy, their neighbor and their friend, to protect a 
black brute who has laid his hands upon a white woman.''37 Blease saw 
this policy as the preserver of law and order. He attributed the absence of 
lynchings during his first six months in office to the Negro's knowledge that 
the militia would not be called to save him from the mobs.38 
Although the legal machinery was completely in the hands of the whites, 
Blease still feared that the black culprit might escape punishment. Victor 
Cheshire, editor of the pro-Blease Anderson Intelligencer and member of 
Blease' s staff, called on the men of his town to storm the jail and lynch a 
Negro charged with assault on a white woman. Blease admitted grudgingly 
that Cheshire was wrong. "Since the negro is already in jail, the law must 
take its course. It would be a different matter if he was not in jail. I would 
•• Columbia State, December 14, 1912. 
•• Simkins, op. cit., pp. 396-398. 
•• Spartanburg Herald, July 5, 1911. 
07 House Journal, 1913, p. 161. 
•• Spartanburg Herald, July 5, 1911. 
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help Cheshire myself then."39 On most occasions, however, his faith in legal 
processes faltered. "How long the white people of South Carolina are going 
to stand this condition of affairs I don't know," he asserted. "When negroes 
assault their women, when they bum their property, when they murder 
their neighbors, they sit by as law-abiding citizens and allow the law to 
take its course ... and the course of the law is delay, delay, delay." Then 
when the white people, "not knowing when the crime of crimes most ter-
rible may be brought home to their wives and daughters" take the law into 
their own hands, they are condemned for their action. 40 He upheld a mob 
as an aroused community which carries out the law but brushes aside the 
law's technicalities and delays. "When mobs are no longer possible," he 
asserted, "liberty will be dead."41 
Blease, like Tillman, was merely expressing a view widely held through-
out the state. At campaign meetings and in speeches he aroused enthusiasm 
with his expressions on lynching. One newspaper predicted that "if every 
true white man in South Carolina were to cast his vote for Blease in ac-
cordance with his sympathy for or against the lynching of the negro rapist, 
Cole Blease would get 99 out of every hundred votes."42 One supporter 
assured him his views were popular among the rural element of the state, 
"I mean the good old country folks, who believe in com bread, 'Old Ned' 
and collards."43 Another reported that the Governor's failure to order out 
troops to prevent the storming of the Laurens jail and lynching of a Negro 
prisoner "is giving unanimous satisfaction."44 
This is not to imply that lynching was endorsed by all. To some it could 
have only unfortunate results: "We haven't got any love for our state, we 
have not the proper respect for our courts because we have successfully 
defied them. It is the whirlwind of disorder that we have to reap, after sow-
ing the wind of disobedience."45 The State led the protest against lynching, 
frequently reporting the details of the most recent instance of the white 
man's justice, and commenting editorially on the barbarity of the practice. 
It termed the protection of southern womanhood a specious justification for 
the practice, and observed: "Being the weaker the woman's greatest pro-
tection is in a society governed by law, and no society is governed by law 
where mob rule in any instance is permitted. When the mob enters, law 
departs."46 It blamed Tillman for the existing attitude, but lost no oppor-
•• Spartanburg Herald, March 3, 1912. 
'
0 Newberry Herald and News, May 6, 1913. 
41 New York Times, August 27, 1915. 
•• Laurensville Herald, August 12, 1910. 
•• J. P. Carlisle to Blease, December 11, 1912, Blease Papers, SCA. 
"John M. Cannon to Blease, August 12, 1913, Blease Papers, SCA. 
•• Abbeville Press and Banner, August 30, 1911. 
•• Columbia State, November 20, 1911. 
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tunity to denounce Blease's rantings on the subject. "Even a cheap imitator 
of Tillman, repeating his dangerous doctrines, finds eager listeners."47 On 
this attitude toward lynching, however, The State did not find unanimity 
among the state press. Many small rural papers defended lynching, though 
they supported the Columbia paper in its general denunciation of Blease. 
Tillman, devoting the greater part of the senate recesses from 1901 to 
1909 to touring the Chatauqua circuit, had familiarized much of the country 
with South Carolina's views on lynching. In 1912 Blease presented a nation-
wide defense of lynching through the press reports of his performance at 
the governors' conference. Among the topics for discussion at the December 
1912 gathering at Richmond, Virginia, was the question of state legislation 
granting divorce. The South Carolina governor staunchly defended his 
state's position in refusing to recognize divorce, but in the course of his 
lengthy speech he became sidetracked onto a discussion of the race ques-
tion. In his customary frank manner, he justified lynching as the only 
honorable means of dealing with the Negro rapist. When asked by one of 
the other governors if this did not mean violation of both federal and state 
constitutions which guaranteed the protection of the law to all men, Blease 
made his appeal to higher law. In words that sent a number of women 
scurrying from the room, he reiterated for the uninitiated the words he had 
used in the campaign of that year: "Whenever the Constitution of my State 
steps between me and the defense of the virtue of the white women of my 
State . . . then I say, to hell with the Constitution." 
A number of the governors criticized Blease severely for his outspoken 
remarks, and their words of chastisement drew cheers from the gallery. To 
avoid the appearance of endorsing Blease's views, the conference adopted 
by a vote of fourteen to four a resolution condemning lynch law and all 
forms of mob rule. The resolution was initiated by Governor Emmet O'Neal 
of Alabama, who denounced the South Carolinian's belittling of the con-
ference and affirmed the duty of every executive present to enforce law 
and order. Those opposing the resolution did so not from sympathy with 
Blease's position, but for fear that it would restrain freedom of speech at 
future conferences. 
Blease's rebuttal to this action came in a torrent of scathing remarks. 
Purple with rage, he restated his position on lynching and shouted: "I don't 
care what you, as a Governors' Conference, or anybody else think about 
it. . . . I wouldn't apologize for a word I have said if you were going to 
expel me from your conference." When greeted with hisses from the gal-
lery, he retorted: "So I am hissed am I? Hisses are the applause of geese." 
He assured those present that when they had long since retired from the 
"Columbia State, November 18, 1911. 
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political scene he would be wearing the senatorial toga and enjoying nation-
wide popularity. He described himself as the real benefactor of the resolu-
tion, as he chided the group: "I will have it engrossed and will take it with 
me on the stump in South Carolina. I will take pleasure in taking it and 
showing it to them and asking what their opinion is."48 
The more enlightened groups in the state were disappointed when South 
Carolina was again subjected to notoriety. The eastern press poured con-
demnation on Blease; and The State, in full sympathy with the Governor's 
detractors, ran the comments in its columns. But not all disapproved of 
Blease's views. Many letters of encouragement came from persons outside 
the state. Blease found, as had Tillman, that sentiment against the Negro 
race was not confined to the South. 
Blease's reaction to the first lynching that occurred during his adminis-
trations clearly illustrated the sincerity of his beliefs. On October 10, 1911, 
near Honea Path, a small town in Anderson County, a seventeen-year old 
Negro boy, Willis Jackson, was killed by a mob. Charged with attacking a 
young white girl, Jackson had been rushed to the Greenville jail with a 
caravan of vengeful citizens in hot pursuit. In the lead automobile sat the 
mob's spokesman, "Citizen Josh" Ashley, illiterate legislator, ardent Blease-
ite, and participant in a lynching six years previously. After arriving safely 
in Greenville, the deputy in charge, with his prisoner and another officer, 
started for Spartanburg and the security of a larger jail. The officers, finding 
the roads muddy and fearing they might be mired down, decided to hide 
out with the prisoner in the woods and ordered their driver to return to 
Greenville. When the driver returned, Ashley cornered him in a drug store 
and coerced him into leading the mob to the Negro. The caravan, bristling 
with weapons, resumed its chase. When it arrived at the site it overpowered 
the officers and made off with the prisoner. As was customary, they re-
turned the culprit to the scene of the crime. Identification was made by the 
alleged victim, and the Negro was hoisted in the air by means of a plow 
line about his left ankle, dangling head-down for several minutes. A fusilade 
followed as an estimated 400 shots tore into the boy's body below the 
waist.49 
•• House Journal, 1913, pp. 69-77. To correct "the criticisms of Cubans, mixed-
breeds, negroes or negro lovers," Blease sent to the general assembly complete tran-
scripts of his speeches at Richmond. For a description of the meeting see Columbia 
State, December 5, 6, 7, 1912; New York Times, December 4, 6, 7, 8, 1912; "Blease 
Among the Governors," Literary Digest, December 1912, pp. 1164-1165; "From Calhoun 
to Blease," The Independent, December 12, 1912, pp. 1383-1384. 
•• Anderson Daily Mail, October 11, 1911; Columbia State, October 11, 1911. Re-
ports differed on Ashley's activities following capture of the boy. Some said he was 
present throughout; others tried to exonerate him by arguing that he had departed after 
turning the boy over to the mob. See Newberry Herald and News, October 13, 1911, 
for Ashley's defense, 
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This incident aroused some protest and demand for the prosecution of 
those who had led the mob. In Anderson the ministerial union led the 
protest and adopted resolutions denouncing the action. But nothing came of 
this and the incident was forgotten. Although South Carolina and her gov-
ernor were subjected to nationwide condemnation, it mattered little to the 
Blease adherents; "justice" had triumphed. 
Governor Blease made no effort to conceal his feelings in the matter. 
He wrote to "Citizen Josh," counseling him to take no notice of any of the 
newspapers: "Half Cubans, half negroes and curs don't fight." He congratu-
lated Ashley on having done his duty; and referring to a recent speech he 
had given at the Ashley family reunion, Blease assured his legislative sup-
porter: "You did just what I told you to do up there at your dinner, in my 
public speech, and you ntied not worry about the results."50 
At a speech in Anderson a few weeks later, Blease stated his views 
more emphatically. On the night of the lynching he had been requested 
to order out the troops; instead he sent a telegram to the Anderson sheriff 
requesting a report next morning on the outcome of events. Clearly imply-
ing he had no intention of interrupting the midnight lynching, he added: 
"The sheriff received my telegram, and he understood it." He went on to 
say that rather than order out troops to defend the "brute," he would have 
resigned his office, caught the first train to Honea Path, and led the mob 
himself. He characterized the ministers who had protested the incident as 
having "more negro blood in their veins than did the negro who was 
lynched." He expressed disbelief that there were twelve men in Anderson 
who would rule against any member of the mob. "If there were twelve men 
who would do so, and a verdict of guilty was returned, I would wire 
pardons to those convicted."51 
Those who defended lynchings invariably referred to the anguish and 
hatred aroused, especially in the case of rape. They argued that the heat 
of passion that gripped the mob on such occasions made the act both under-
standable and justifiable. But many instances of lynching failed to conform 
to this pattern. The greater number during Governor Blease's administra-
tions were for reasons other than rape; one was for the minor offense of 
fighting with a white man.52 Nor did the mobs always appear to be acting 
in the heat of passion, but at times carried out their morbid task in a quiet 
and methodical manner.53 
•• Blease to Hon. Josh W. Ashley, October 16, 1911, Blease Papers, SCA. 
•
1 Columbia State, November 12, 1911; New York Times, November 13, 1911. 
•• Of eighteen Negroes lynched during this period, only three were charged with 
rape or attempted rape. For figures on the lynchings, see below, n. 59. 
•• Newberry Herald and News, June 3, 1913. 
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Mutilation of the body, which sometimes occurred, was the most bar-
baric aspect of the whole proceedings. It is a frightening thought indeed 
that some of the things reported were the work of twentieth-century man. 
Following the Negro's dispatch by hanging, shooting, or burning alive, some 
of the participants removed fingers and toes from the body for preservation 
as mementoes; this had been done at the lynching of Willis Jackson.54 The 
worst example of mutilation during this period occurred in 1913. Richard 
Henry Austin, a Negro charged with murder and attempted assault on a 
white woman, was pursued into Georgia by a posse. As the result of 
wounds, Austin died before he could be returned to the state. But the 
spirit of vengeance did not die with the criminal. When the sheriff, who 
was returning with the body, stopped in the early morning hours to eat, 
the body was removed from his car and returned to Hampton, the site of 
the alleged crime. What happened afterward is best described in the words 
of the newspaper account: "The toes and fingers were first cut off as me-
mentoes. Then the head was severed from the body, the right arm was 
taken off, the body was placed on a fire, singed and burnt. Next ropes were 
fastened to the body. It was suspended from the limb of an oak tree, where 
it now swings. All night long people came, viewed the body of the des-
perado, and then quietly went to their homes."55 
Occasionally an incident pointed out the dangers involved in the mob's 
usurpation of the court's function. Such an incident occurred in Spartanburg 
in August 1913. Will Farr, an alleged Negro rapist confined in the jail, was 
threatened by a mob. Governor Blease's reply to the magistrate's call for 
troops was that a special term of court would be called on September 1, 
little consolation to the besieged law officers and their prisoner. With a rare 
display of courage, the sheriff, W. J. White, held the mob at bay; through 
a ruse he managed to escape with the Negro to the state penitentiary in 
Columbia.56 The sheriff's conduct was unusual in that law officers were 
generally overpowered, some with so little resistance as to indicate sym-
pathy with the mob. But other developments made this case unique. In an 
exception to the rule, three men were found guilty of storming the jail and 
sentenced to three years in the penitentiary.57 And on September 20, 1913, 
a white jury freed the Negro on the ground that the woman who had 
charged him was subject to hallucinations and had falsely accused him.58 
•• Columbia State, October 11, 1911. 
•• Newberry Herald and News, June 3, 1913. 
•• Columbia State, August 19, 20, 1913. 
•• Charleston News and Courier, November 26, 29, 1913. Shortly before leaving 
office, Blease freed these men. New York Times, December 31, 1914. 
""Columbia State, September 21, 1913. 
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During Governor Blease' s administrations there were eighteen lynchings 
and seven attempted lynchings,59 not an exceptional number compared 
with lynchings during previous administrations. The governor, of course, 
was not directly involved in all of these. There were, in fact, instances in 
which he facilitated the transfer of prisoners to the penitentiary for safe-
keeping in the wake of rumors that a lynching was pending. 60 But in a 
larger sense he bore responsibility in each instance. His inflammatory words 
in defense of lynching were damaging to the concept of law and order and 
set the official stamp of approval on extra-legal action. And who can say 
how far-reaching has been the impact on South Carolina's history of such 
irresponsible utterances? 
Governor Blease did not create the race issue but exploited it to his 
political advantage. Not only did he make no effort to improve relations 
between the races, but by his pandering to prejudice his agitation of the 
Negro question added to the complexity of the problem that was passed 
to future generations of South Carolinians. 
•• Jack Simpson Mullins, "Lynching in South Carolina, 1900-1914," unpublished 
M.A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1961, pp. 130-131. Useful mainly for the 
analysis of lynchings during this period, noting time, place, and motive. The break-
down of figures during Blease's administrations indicates clearly that the crime of rape 
was not the principal reason for lynching. The victims and the alleged crimes were as 
follows: three (murder); four ( arson or attempted arson); three ( rape or attempted 
rape); one ( aiding in rapist's escape); two (robbery); one ( fight with white man); one 
( assault and battery); one ( frightening a woman); two ( killed during riot resulting 
from punishment of Negro charged with arson). As disgraceful as this record was, 
figures covering a broader period indicate that in comparison with other states of the 
Deep South, lynchings occurred less frequently in South Carolina. Lynchings during 
the years 1889-1918 show: South Carolina, 120; Georgia, 386; Mississippi, 373; Ala-
bama, 276; Florida, 178. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889-1918, New York, 1919, pp. 31-32. 
•
0 Newberry Herald and News, March 19, 1912; Charleston News and Courier, May 
9, 1911; Anderson Daily Mail, December 4, 1913; Blease to J. B. Gunter, March 13, 
1912, Blease Papers, SCA. Significantly, none of those granted executive protection was 
an alleged rapist. 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AGE OF 
THE DICTATORS 
PRESTON w. SLOSSON 
As every historian knows, the twentieth century began in 1914, just as 
the nineteenth century began in 1789. The First World War ended an age 
of progress toward constitutional and parliamentary government, as the 
French Revolution began the downfall of autocratic monarchy and class 
privilege. 
The nineteenth-century struggle was, in the main, a conflict between 
hereditary "divine right" and democratic popular right. The dictator, whose 
right is might and who can appeal neither to ancestral authority nor to 
free election, was rare on the European stage, although endemic in parts 
of Latin America. The two outstanding European dictators, Napoleon 
Bonaparte and Louis Napoleon, lost no time in transforming republican 
dictatorships into dynastic empires, thus enlisting in the old and respec-
table guild of kings. From the time of Napoleon III to the Russian revolu-
tion of 1917 there is hardly a single clear-cut case of dictatorship in Europe. 
Between the First and the Second World Wars, however, we can count 
at least a score of dictators. Beginning in Russia with Lenin in 1917, passing 
into Italy with Mussolini in 1923 and into Spain with Primo de Rivera in 
1924, exploding with the shock of the great depression into Germany in 
1933, the institution of dictatorship spread over nearly the whole of south-
ern, central, and eastern Europe before war returned to Europe. Today, the 
picture is altered in some details. Dictatorships of the Fascist type are now 
limited to Spain and Portugal, survivals of an earlier generation like ice-
bergs carried by an ocean current into the tropics. But communist dicta-
torship, once confined to Russia, now controls eight European satellites, to 
make no mention of those in Asia. 
Latin America, always familiar with the "man on horseback," has con-
tinued to produce dictators of every type from "rightist" reactionaries like 
Trujillo, Batista, and Huerta to "leftist" demagogues such as Castro and 
Peron. ( I might add that ideologies often yield to opportunist considera-
tions, and that extreme authoritarians often begin their political careers as 
populistic rebels). Most of the newly emancipated nations in Asia and in 
Africa are at this moment under military rulers of unbounded authority. 
Probably half the people on this planet obey a dictator. Surely, this century 
is an "age of the dictators." 
What is dictatorship, anyhow? Like all matters of definition, the dicta-
torship may be described by first setting boundaries, by stating what it is 
not; the more so, since no term is more notoriously abused. Every strong 
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government has been called a dictatorship by its foes, just as every con-
servative in our day has been called a fascist and every radical a com-
munist. But to use words merely as brickbats, while sometimes an enjoyable 
sport, is of very little practical value to political science. 
In the first place, a dictator is not a ruler by hereditary right. One of 
the special characteristics of the dictator is that he is the son of his own 
deeds and may spring from any social level whatever. There is a difference 
between a Charles I and a Cromwell, between a King Louis and a Napo-
leon, between a Tsar Nicholas and a Lenin. A dictator may found a dynasty, 
but he is never the product of one. 
Again, a very powerful president or prime minister is not a dictator if 
he is still dependent on the will of a monarch, a parliament, or a freely 
voting public, or if he keeps within the limits of a constitution. Nobody 
was ever more powerful than Richelieu or Bismarck, but Louis XIII could 
have dismissed Richelieu at a moment's notice, and Wilhelm II did dismiss 
his Iron Chancellor. Our war presidents have exercised enormous authority, 
but they could not postpone crucial elections by even one day. British 
prime ministers are wholly at the mercy of the House of Commons. The 
three great leaders of the First World War, Wilson, Lloyd-George, and 
Clemenceau, soon met political reverses which ended their official careers. 
Of the similar triumvirate in the Second World War, Roosevelt, Churchill, 
and Stalin, only dictator Stalin appeared at Potsdam. 
For rough practical purposes a dictatorship may be defined as any 
executive power which is subject to no traditional, constitutional, legal, or 
popular control. It is nearly always embodied in a single man, but it can 
be exercised by a small and closely united council or committee, like the 
Committee of Public Safety in the French Revolution, or the two Roman 
Triumvirates. These examples, however, show that internal dissensions are 
apt to break up a collective dictatorship and lead to the normal one man 
rule. It required only a few months after the death of Lenin for Stalin to 
rise head and shoulders above the other communist leaders. 
The name and title of the dictator matters nothing, for dictatorship is 
a political fact rather than a political form. He may be an Imperator like 
Julius Caesar, a Princeps like Augustus, a Lord Protector like Cromwell, 
a First Consul like Napoleon, a prime minister like Mussolini, a party 
secretary like Stalin, a mere minister of war like Pilsudski in Poland. There 
may be a king nominally above him, as King Victor Emmanuel III stood 
above Mussolini; but Il Duce could more easily have dismissed the king, 
than the king could have gotten rid of his minister, until military defeat 
had cut the ground from under the whole fascist structure. The question 
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is never "who has the nominal legal authority" but "whom will the army 
in fact obey?" 
Dictatorships can be classified in various ways, such as monarchical or 
republican, radical or conservative, military or civilian. But a far more fun-
damental difference than any of these is that between an ordinary political 
dictatorship, such as is so common in the Spanish American countries, and 
a "totalitarian" dictatorship which aims at nothing less than the transforma-
tion of the whole national life. In the former type, the government asks little 
of the individual citizen except to obey the laws, pay the taxes, and refrain 
from criticizing the public authorities. But a totalitarian dictatorship con-
trols the business firms, the trades unions, the schools, the churches, litera-
ture, art, science, domestic life, the hours of work, and the sports of leisure. 
Thus Mussolini tried ( not very successfully) to transform the easy-going, 
genial, unwarlike modern Italians into stern, proud Roman soldiers. Hitler 
had his dream of a Germany of Nordic supermen. Kemal Atati.irk told the 
Turks how to dress, what calendar to use, in what script to write their 
language. 
Most of the totalitarian dictatorships fall into one of two classes: fascist 
or communist. Fascism, in the strict sense of the word, is the regime which 
Mussolini instituted in Italy. But the term has been generally applied to 
similar systems in other countries, such as Hitler's Germany. It might be 
defined as a type of totalitarian dictatorship whose appeal is chiefly to 
national patriotism; not the communist slogan "workers of the world unite," 
but rather "sons of the fatherland unite." Because it is apt to arise from a 
feeling of national humiliation and wounded vanity, fascism is usually 
militaristic and imperialistic. It tolerates private property-in this diverging 
from communism-but it keeps private property under strict state regula-
tion, and is the very opposite of the individualistic laissez-faire of the nine-
teenth century. Being intensely nationalistic and somewhat anti-foreign, 
fascism cannot form an international party like communism's Third Inter-
national, although fascist states can and do copy each other and ally for 
common interests. 
Communism professes to aim at universal peace, international union, 
and a classless social order. This gives communism a world appeal, and a 
great initial propaganda advantage over fascism and other national regimes. 
Actually, however, the difference is not so great in practice as in theory. 
Just as the French revolutionists identified liberty, equality and fraternity, 
with the military victory of the French Republic, so ( since Russia was long 
the only great communist state) communists tended more and more to 
identify their class and party movement with the national power of Soviet 
Russia. During the German invasion of 1941, the most effective appeals to 
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the Russian people were patriotic-Slav versus Teuton, rather than prole-
tarian versus bourgeois. In China communism seems to be taking on an 
anti-European, even an anti-Russian, coloring; technically, the Chinese are 
divided from the Russians on purely theoretical points of Marxian policy, 
actually the motive behind it all seems to be racist and nationalist-"Asia 
for the Asiatics." The divergence of Yugoslavia from the rest of communist 
Europe seems to arise almost wholly from dictator Tito's fear that Russia 
would exploit Yugoslav industry and resources to Russian advantage. Al-
though fascism and communism profess opposite theories and represent, 
as a rule, different social groups, they tend more and more to resemble each 
other because of their one-party systems of government, their repression 
of all criticism and opposition, their exaltation of the omnipotent state, 
and their appeal to patriotic feeling. 
Two features, which characterize twentieth-century dictatorships and 
differentiate the modern type from many earlier examples, are demagogic 
appeal and party structure. On the face of it, one would think that a gov-
ernment which rested on force and did not need to win an election could 
afford to ignore public opinion. Instead, practically every modern dictator 
has played the courtier to its own subjects. Not content with the negative 
action, common to all dictatorships, of suppressing hostile comment in the 
press, the government uses the newspapers, the radio, the motion pictures, 
and recently television, to guide and mould opinion. Napoleon perhaps 
started this with the propaganda bulletins in his official press, but modern 
means of communication and persuasion have multiplied his method a 
hundred fold. 
It should be remembered that most modern dictators, even those on the 
extreme Right, began their careers as popular demagogues who were at 
home with crowds. Hitler and Mussolini were both originally socialists, and 
so were many of the French and British would-be fascists, such as Oswald 
Mosley. Moreover, the dictator needs more justification than a legitimate 
or constitutional ruler; an ancient line of kings, even in exile, will still have 
its partisans, but the dictator must keep always on top of the wave or he 
will be hauled down by rivals who think their own claims as good as his. 
An Austrian governor in Italian Milan in 1850, or a Russian chief of police 
in Polish Warsaw, knew and accepted his own unpopularity; he ruled by 
forbidding all political parties and discussion. But the twentieth-century 
dictator is more like a Hyde Park soapboxer who has taken away the other 
boxes so that he will have the only audience. 
This fact is closely related to another, the one-party system. A dictator 
might rule, as many a despot has done, without any party at all, relying on 
the army to enforce obedience and on the bureaucracy to carry out the tasks 
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of administration. But practically every one of the twentieth-century dicta-
torships rests on a political party: fascist in Italy, Falangist in Spain, na-
tional socialist in Germany, communist in Russia, China, and the small 
nations of eastern Europe. In some countries the dominant group called 
itself by some such name as "National Union" or "Fatherland Front" and 
represented a coalition of factions supporting the government; but in no 
case was any real and vocal opposition party tolerated. Evidently there is a 
felt need for an agency which can reach down among the people, educate 
them in the dominant ideology, and whip up enthusiasm for the govern-
ment policy. 
Why has the twentieth century, which in so many ways has represented 
the triumph of liberal, democratic, and humanitarian ideals, become the 
century of the dictator? It is no answer to say that the people simply sub-
mitted to force. It is true that a dictator once in power is hard to get rid 
of except by assassination, revolution, or civil war; but these dictators were 
not born to power, they climbed into the seats of the mighty on the shoul-
ders of other men. Often a great wave of popularity gave them their start. 
Although Hitler never commanded a majority of the Germans in any free 
election, his party did rise to about two-fifths of the electorate before he 
became chancellor. Lenin secured a similar percentage in the elections for 
the Constituent Assembly, which he later dismissed by force because he 
did not control an absolute majority. Mussolini's fascists had wide popular 
support before his march on Rome. Although no dictator has ever per-
mitted a genuinely free election, it is quite possible that, should they risk it, 
Khrushchev might win such a test in Russia or Castro in Cuba. When a 
dictatorship collapses it has few friends, but so long as the nation seems 
to be prosperous and powerful, people are strangely ready to forgive their 
loss of liberty. 
One answer to the question is that dictatorship, by its very nature, is a 
response to a crisis; it is not so much a form of government as a substitute 
for such a form. The machine of state has broken down, and an emergency 
engineer has been called in to start it up again. Almost invariably, the dic-
tatorship has arisen from foreign or civil war, from fear of conquest, or 
from some acute economic crisis. Without the English Civil War no Crom-
well; without the French Revolution no Napoleon. Now, the twentieth 
century has already seen three major catastrophies: two World Wars and 
the great depression midway between them. The First World War created 
the Russian dictatorship and led indirectly to the Italian; the depression 
destroyed the German Republic and hoisted Hitler into power; the Second 
World War spread a rash of communist dictatorships over eastern Europe 
and eastern Asia. If no European dictatorships arose in Europe between 
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Louis Napoleon and Lenin it may be because the 1871-1914 period was, 
in general, one of peaceful development both within and among the nations. 
In desperation, any nation may clutch at a straw, but only in desperation. 
I can think of no instance of a people long accustomed to self-government, 
and enjoying peaceful and prosperous times, who have voluntarily accepted 
a dictator. 
The twentieth century has seen the creation of new nations, or newly 
reorganized nations, on an unprecedented scale. Some of these people had 
never enjoyed real self-government within living memory; others had only 
a few years experience of the most difficult of all the arts, self-rule, before 
their newly hatched constitutions broke down under internal and external 
pressure. Surely, a major cause of the success of democracy in the United 
States and Canada, and of its relative failure in Spanish America, is that 
England tolerated much local home rule in colonial times, whereas the 
Spanish colonies were governed by imported officials. Similarly, the com-
parative success of independence in India and the Philippines, as contrasted 
with Korea, Viet-Nam, Indonesia, Syria, and the Congo, is doubtless in 
large part due to the fact that the British in India, and we ourselves in 
the Philippines, had long been giving the native peoples some experience 
in self-government on the installment plan. 
Dictatorship, indeed, seems to be one of the diseases which affiict only 
infant democracies. I have been giving you a very gloomy picture of the 
wide and rapid spread of twentieth-century dictatorships, but there is one 
encouraging factor: no long-established popular governments came down 
with the ailment. To be sure, there are not many such countries: Great 
Britain and her Dominions, the United States, the Netherlandish and Scan-
dinavian nations, and Switzerland make up nearly the whole list. France 
is a borderline case; her traditions of constitutional self-government date 
back to 1789 but have twice been interrupted by dictatorship-the first and 
third Napoleons. All these nations escaped twentieth-century dictatorship. 
But the Germans had only fourteen troubled years of self-government be-
tween the fall of the autocratic Empire and the far more drastic rule of 
Hitler; Italy two generations between her creation as an independent na-
tion and the rise of fascism; Russia only six months-and those in the 
midst of a disastrous war-between the Tsar and the communist com-
missars. Most of the lesser states of America, Europe, Asia, and Africa have 
had very little training in the disciplines of freedom. Of course, a nuclear 
war can upset all predictions. But, barring that catastrophe, I confidently 
predict that, in the degree to which the nations of the world acquire polit-
ical experience, they will more and more turn to constitutional freedom. 
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There remains a final word-how shall we evaluate dictatorship? I have 
assumed your agreement in classing it as an evil, but many would not agree 
with you and me. Is it not Carlyle's government by the strong man; the 
man who can and will do what needs to be done, while parliamentary 
chatterers are (in Dickens's phrase) busy discussing how not to do it? We 
must, I think, concede one point. The dictator, as the son of his own deeds, 
is more apt to be a man of action than is an hereditary monarch who owes 
everything to the accident of birth, or a timid bureaucrat, or an elected 
windbag. 
The debit side of the ledger, however, is longer. In the first place a 
dictator is almost always oppressive-certainly repressive-because his ten-
ure is insecure; no dictator has ever yet permitted a free press or an open 
election, and the absence of those things is the surest test as to the presence 
of dictatorship. Again, a dictator must constantly whip up enthusiasm for 
his rule, and the easiest, but most dangerous, way of doing this is by a 
"vigorous foreign policy" with war as a possible end result. Again, the 
death of a dictator always poses a political crisis, whereas both hereditary 
monarchy and elective democracy provide for an orderly and peaceful suc-
cession. One "savior of society" at a time may be a boon, but when several 
men compete for the coveted post civil war is the usual outcome. Finally, 
even if the dictator were an archangel of wisdom and beneficence, the final 
consequence of his autocracy would be a childish people, incapable of self-
government, inclined to "let George do it" rather than assume responsibility 
for their own destiny. In John Buchan's phrase, the Roman principate, while 
it brought many administrative benefits, took the "salt and iron" out of the 
Roman people. 
I think we may dismiss the too common argument that dictatorships are 
necessary because "people must have bread before they have freedom." 
These two boons are allies rather than rivals. Nine times out of ten the 
most prosperous nations are also the freest, though I am not quite sure 
whether the moral is that freedom brings prosperity, or that prosperous 
people are more apt to demand freedom. What Napoleon and Mussolini 
saved by careful administration they spent again on disastrous foreign ad-
ventures. Hitler cured unemployment by rearming Germany, only to leave 
the fatherland in far worse condition in 1945 than it had been in 1933. 
Russia and China, no doubt, have become rapidly industrialized under 
communism, but this has been at the cost of agricultural scarcity and even 
famine. If Russia had kept to the slow path of democratic progress, there 
might not be a sputnik in the skies but there would be a better filled larder 
in the peasant's cabin. As Goering truly put it, dictatorship offers as its goal 
"guns instead of butter." Anyone who advocates dictatorship for economic 
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reasons might well join the fabled crowd that gathered round the royal 
palace shouting "Less bread! More taxes!" 
But to say that dictatorship is an almost unmitigated evil is not to say 
that it is always avoidable. In conditions such as confronted England after 
the death of Charles I, and Spain after the breakdown of parliamentary 
government in 1936, when there is no way of establishing a majority which 
will support any one party or program, someone will step in and take the 
helm. A power vacuum cannot long endure; if people cannot get free gov-
ernment, they will take good government; if they cannot even get good 
government, they will take government on any terms. Anything rather than 
anarchy. The defense against dictatorship is not in paper constitutions, 
which the dictator will soon contemptuously toss aside; nor in a democratic 
government so weak and divided that it cannot meet emergencies. Far 
more important than any system of checks and balances are three political 
good habits, which the older democracies seem to have learned: absolute 
acquiescence in the will of the majority, which must never be challenged 
by force; freedom of all minorities to seek to change the government by 
peaceful discussion and political propaganda; willingness to compromise 
and cooperate so that stable majorities can be formed. Neglect of the first 
of these principles leads to the annual revolutions in some Caribbean coun-
tries, where defeated parties take regularly to military plots to attain the 
power denied them by the ballot box. Neglect of the second, leads to the 
one party dictatorship of the ludicrously misnamed "Peoples' Democracies" 
of the communist nations. Neglect of the third, leads to parliamentary 
deadlocks and stalemates, such as have been the prelude to many dictator-
ships in continental Europe. Equally foolish are the fears that popular 
government, if mindful of these principles, will be too strong for freedom, 
or will be too free for strength. As Samuel Gompers, the labor leader, once 
put it: "Men do not realize how safe a thing freedom isl" 
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